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ABSTRACT
This target article summarizes our discourse on one of the major
questions raised in our recent book “Evolution Science and Ethics in
the Third Millennium,” namely, to what degree are traditional religious
belief systems and modern secular ideologies capable of contributing
to an evolutionarily based ethical framework that can guide humanity
to higher levels of hominization within the context of a further
progressing modernization and a sustainable planetary ecology? The
article concludes with some reflections on the need for interfaith
dialogue and the possibility of integrating traditional religious belief
systems and modern secular ideologies into a long-term evolutionarily
based ethical approach.
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1. Introduction
In this target article for the RBB symposium we address challenges identified in the book Evolution
Science and Ethics in the Third Millennium: Challenges and Choices for Humankind (Cliquet & Avra-
mov, 2018) and summarize the key arguments developed in view of suggesting discussion points for
the symposium.
1.1. Concept and approach
In our book we revitalize the interdisciplinary debate about evolutionary ethics and substantiate the
idea that evolution science can provide a rational and robust framework for understanding morality
and for addressing looming ethical dilemmas.
We discuss strengths and weaknesses of both traditional belief systems and secular ideologies
from a long-term evolutionary point of view. We trace pathways for knowledge-based choices to
be made about directions for future long-term biological evolution and cultural development. We
discuss needs for adaptation to the expected, probable and possible future and for ensuring the eco-
logical sustainability of our planetary environment.
We apply our approach to the ethical challenges associated with the major biosocial sources of
human variation: individual variation, inter-personal variation, inter-group variation, and inter-gen-
erational variation.
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We conclude the book with some reflections about the need to reconcile traditional and modern
ideologies and incite thinkers and doers to join forces in reflecting, adopting, and implementing evol-
ution-based ethical goals for securing the long-term progressive evolution of humanity.
2. Value conflicts and global world ethic
The present is characterized by conflicts of values that result from the clash between religiously
revealed ethical systems, secular ideologies, and modern sciences which are changing the limits of
what is possible and desirable.
The current debates generally lose sight of the longer-term historical dimension and knowledge
that humankind is the outcome of the hominization process that is largely a biological adaptation to
the living conditions existing in the Pleistocene era, the “Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness”
(EEA). Modernization is only a very recent revolutionary cultural innovation to which humans are
neither genetically, nor morally well adapted. Hence, we propose that reflecting on longer term value
and norm changes needs to be conceptualized from a broad evolutionary perspective taking into
account past, present and possible future developments.
Discussion point
Does the approach developed in this book, and summarized in this article, provide a solid basis for
arguing that the plurality of ethical premises in the emerging global world may be adequately addressed
through an evolutionary perspective?
3. Understanding the origin and evolution of morality
We argue that the evolutionary toolkit is applicable both to genetic traits and cultural traits, and in
particular to value and norm related phenomena such as morality and religion. Evolution science,
and in particular the development of the Second Darwinian Revolution, contributed to the under-
standing of specific evolutionary mechanisms—kin selection, reciprocal selection, coercive selection,
and group selection—that explain the evolution of moral behavior.
We argue that basic biological needs—ontogenetic development, sociality and reproduction—and
biological-evolutionary processes, including the shift from instinctive to conscious behavior in hominine
evolution, the increasing prematurity of hominine offspring during the hominization process, and the
development of human sociability beyond the stage of the family are the fundamental causes of the origin
and evolution of human morality. They resulted in the development of innate moral senses, the acqui-
sition of the capacity for learning to behave in amoralway, and especially the attainment of the capacity of
moral reasoning that allows for the development of conscious moral judgment and decision making.
In the evolution of morality we distinguish three major bio-cultural stages: (1) a biosocial stage, cor-
responding to the biological hominization process; (2) a cultural-religious stage, linked to the develop-
ment of the agricultural era; and (3) a cultural-scientific stage that emerged in the wake of the modern
scientific revolution. On the question whether humanity has made moral progress in the course of this
evolution and history, we tend to join the expert consensus that, in general, a historical progress can be
discerned, albeit we do not deny that periodically upsurges of morally regressive phenomena do occur.
Specific biological fields such as genetics and neurology evince the important role of biological
determinants in the development of moral behavior. They also explain the existence of variation
in personality characteristics and/or moral codes that can, in particular circumstances, result in
diverse forms of (im)moral behavior.
Discussion point
Morality remains the essential driver of humanontogenetic developmentandphylogenetic evolution.Circum-
stantial cultural and ecological factors, such as the evolutionarily novel modernization process and current
challenges in the domain of ecology, can induce specific new moral requirements and drivers.
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4. In-group nature of religious belief systems and moral divide
The early appearance of religious rituals among the later hominines, the universality of religiosity in
Homo sapiens, and the involvement of genetic and neurological factors in various forms and degrees
of spiritual and religious behavior all lead to the key conclusion: in the course of the hominization
process, natural selection must have favored the introduction and spreading of genes that made the
human brain receptive to spiritual and religious phenomena, facilitating the experience and enjoy-
ment of spiritual and religious activities. In the evolutionary perspective the human brain was
selected, either as an adaptation or as an exaptation, to be sensitive and receptive for spiritual and
religious phenomena.
We focus on examples of the Mediterranean religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—to identify
features and achievements of organized religions from an evolutionary perspective. They may be sum-
marized as follows. Judaism appears as a strongly and largely genealogically focused in-group-oriented
ideology that has significantly contributed to group survival throughout history, notwithstanding almost
systematic experience of out-group enmity. Christian ideology introduced important evolutionary novel-
ties by expressing its concern for “the wretched of the earth” and breaking through the narrow tribal in-
group centrism. It continued to foster the “in-group/out-group” bipolarity, but now the in-group was
based on amore global understanding of righteousness rather than shared ancestry. The founding fathers
of Islam strongly imprinted the patriarchal organization of their agrarian/pastoral society on their new
religion and promoted the Arabian identity and expansion in large parts of the world. This was further
fueled by the contents of the Qur’anic religious-political teachings.
This brief analysis of the ideologies of the Abrahamic religions lead to some preliminary con-
clusions. The tenets of these worldviews appeared late in the evolution of the hominines and
enhanced social cohesion, but their alleged divine attributions and revelations did not address the
salient inequalities among peoples of genetic, ontogenetic, or purely social origin.
Religions continue today to influence ethical thinking through predisposition, indoctrination and
education. Many people adhere to the traditional dogmas and draw their motivation for individual
and societal action from their religious beliefs. This may be explained by the fact that all religious
traditions include many basic ethical rules which are of a universal nature. This is because they
were ultimately the result of Darwinian selection processes related to the biological specificities
and needs of the human species.
In our discourse about the adaptive advantages and disadvantages of religiosity/religion, we argue
that religiosity/religion had several advantages. In pre-modern environments these include under-
standing and mastering the facts of life and death, promoting ingroup social cohesion, reinforcing
the social dominance of the leadership, and, ultimately, favoring survival and reproductive fitness.
However, in modernity religions are in many respects maladapted to the novel environment created
by science and its technological and societal applications in the global world. Adherence to religiosity
may continue to have some individual and social advantages, mainly for the faithful.
Discussion point
Spirituality/religiosity is part of the human biological heritage that, together with its cultural
expressions in the hunter-gatherer and agrarian stages of human history, had adaptive functions in
those stages. However, many present cultural remnants of those stages are no longer well adapted
to the exigencies of modernity. They are insufficiently robust to further develop the potential of the
human species to reach higher levels of cultural development and biological evolution.
5. Fragmented nature of secular ideologies
In the chapter on secular ideologies we briefly discuss the major ideologies that developed in the
wake of the modern scientific revolution and in the aftermath of the Enlightenment: liberalism,
socialism, feminism, nationalism, ecologism, and humanism. We also pay some attention to the
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twentieth century authoritarian ideologies of communism and fascism/Nazism. Finally, we briefly
discuss capitalism, mainly because of its alleged relations to evolutionary theory.
We argue that the main characteristic of modern secular ideologies is that they approach moral
dilemmas and challenges in modernity in a strongly fragmented way. Moreover, several of those
modern ideologies seem to be mutually incompatible. In contrast to traditional religions that offer
an all-encompassing, cohesive and integrated vision, modern secular ideologies have, so far, been
unable to agree on a holistic worldview. None provide a set of guiding values and norms for addres-
sing multifaceted short-term problems and the long-term evolutionary future.
Most of the modern secular ideologies lack, perhaps with the exception of humanism and ecologism, a
vision about the long-term future. They are quite reserved if not totally silent about intergenerational
goals. From an evolutionary point of view, their short-term approach obviously is a serious shortcoming.
Life is essentially an intergenerational process that should duly be taken into consideration. This is of
particular importance in modernization because of its possible harmful effects on future generations
and lasting detrimental influence on the biosphere and even the physical environment.
Finally, we claim that modern secular ideologies underachieve in applying or even strengthening
moral principles and practices at the micro- or interpersonal levels. They mainly apply their inter-
ventions at macro-levels but forget to properly respond to our ancient and profound needs for inter-
personal relations, assistance, sense of belonging, care and love.
Discussion point
The current fragmented and mostly short-term perspective of modern secular ideologies are no valu-
able alternative to the traditional religions as all-encompassing, cohesive and integrated worldviews,
with guiding values and norms.
6. The need for identifying evolution-based, worldwide goals
The rationale for evolutionarily based ethical choices in a further progressing modernity is embedded
in the exigencies deriving from the bio-cultural specificity of human nature.
We identify the preservation of ecological sustainability and the further progression of the mod-
ernization process as the two major conditional higher order goals. We propose the phylogenetic
furtherance of the hominization process as the central goal of a desirable worldwide ethic. From
this central goal we identify five derived goals: (1) the ontogenetic development of human-specific
potentialities; (2) the promotion of quality of life, if necessary, at the expense of quantitative
goals; (3) the promotion of solidarity/equal opportunities; (4) the shift from competitive toward
co-operative social organization; and (5) the promotion of universalism/globalism.
6.1. Higher order goals
6.1.1. Preservation of ecological sustainability
The present human mismanagement of the planet’s ecology is characterized by biodiversity extinction,
depletion of natural resources, environmental pollution, and anthropogenic climate change. This destruc-
tion results from a number of human innate drives such as resource and territory possession and expan-
sion, in-group favoritism, dominance behavior, and reproductive multiplication. It is, moreover,
reinforced by archaic cultural solutions to existential life problems. Ecological recovery and sustainability
need to become more important than “multiply and fill the earth and subdue it” (Genesis 1:28).
Discussion point
Our key ethical message is to move away from quantity and dominance towards quality by limiting
our demographic growth, gradually decreasing world population size, changing our consumption pat-
terns, and taking better care of our vulnerable planet.
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6.1.2. The further progression of the modernization process
We consider the modernization process as a positive achievement of humankind, despite some of its
temporarily unfavorable but corrigible side effects. The idea of a further progressing modernization
that would spread all over the world has been challenged by some who argue for the development of
multiple modernities. However, we consider that the various combinations of traditional and mod-
ern can only be a temporary or intermediate stage in the cultural development of the human species.
Discussion point
Themodernization process is mainly driven by the progress of themodern sciences, which are themost power-
ful unifying element in modern culture. Hence, our conclusion that the further progression of the moderniz-
ation process, in its enlightened or matured form, at the global level, is the second major conditional tenet.
6.1.3. The phylogenetic furtherance of the hominization process
We consider the phylogenetic furtherance of the hominization process for the long-term future of
humanity, ultimately resulting in the evolution of a posthuman stage in this process, as the central
goal in an evolution-based ethics. It is an old idea that, in recent years, has been actively revived by
the transhumanist movement.
The rationale for the choice of a further progressing hominization goal is that the past direction in
human evolution is characterized by a process of evolutionary complexification that has resulted in
an increased potential to understand the world, to adapt better to environmental diversity and chal-
lenges, to master our biology and environment, to satisfy our needs and desires, and to reach higher
levels of quality of life and happiness. The extrapolation of this process will further increase the
human-specific potentials and further enhance the welfare and wellbeing of humans.
Discussion point
The informed hypothesis is that a higher evolved hominine stage than the present Homo sapiens stage
could put future humankind in a better position to cope with the cosmic, biological and socio-cultural
challenges with which they will be confronted in the future.
6.2. Derived goals
6.2.1. The ontogenetic development of human-specific potentialities
Human ontogeny depends not only on its phylogenetic heritage, but also on the physical, biological,
social and cultural environment in which it needs to be developed. It can be subject to a considerable
variation, going from a minimal up to a maximal development.
Discussion point
Our evolutionarily defined central goal—the furtherance of the hominization process—implies that the
ontogenetic development of human-specific potentialities, as the primary derived goal, be achieved at
its highest possible level, and also that the further ontogenetic enhancement of human-specific features
be pursued at that highest level.
6.2.2. The promotion of quality of life, whenever necessary, at the expense of quantitative
goals
Just as the nature of the phylogenetic goal in an evolutionary conceived ethics (i.e., the furtherance of
the hominization process) defines the nature of the ontogenetic goal (i.e., the development of
human-specific potentialities at the highest possible level), the ontogenetic goal, in turn, results in
the pursuance of the maximization of quality of life.
In the pre-modern stages of our evolution and history, achieving high quantity often supported
survival and the achievement of high quality. However, modernization has already boosted world
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population size and consumption patterns to high levels, the combination of which already surpasses
the planet’s ecological carrying capacity.
Discussion point
In a further progressing modernization, the traditional positive relationship between quality and
quantity may be reversed to a negative one. Namely, the further pursuance of ever higher levels of qual-
ity of life for the whole of humanity will have to be achieved at the expense of quantitative goals, in
particular regarding world population numbers.
6.2.3. The promotion of equal opportunities
Genetic variation is, from an evolutionary point of view, an extremely important phenomenon
because it provides opportunities for adaptation in changing environmental living conditions. At
the same time, genetic and other causes of biological variation produce social inequalities that
may be a source of several forms of social friction.
Modernization is characterized by strong efforts to reconcile the facts of biological diversity with
the ideals of equality and equity by creating equal opportunities.
Discussion point
An evolution-based ethics will, in the context of a further progressing modernization, simultaneously
have to positively value some aspects of genetic diversity and compensate for resulting inequalities by
strongly focusing on enhancing equality of social opportunities.
6.2.4. The necessary shift from competitive towards co-operative societies
The hominization process is characterized by a shift from competitive towards co-operative behav-
ior. However, humans remain endowed with drives for both competition and co-operation. The
modernization process has strongly accelerated the trend towards increased co-operation, at least
at the macro-level. Nevertheless, our genetic predispositions, selected to deal with social interactions
in and between small populations, are no longer well adapted to the co-operative requirements in our
novel environment.
Discussion point
A further progressing modernization will require an ever-increasing need for co-operation, at all levels
of social organization.
6.2.5. The promotion of universalism/globalism
The specific human genome emerged and evolved in Pleistocene times, when people lived in small
tribes, and interacted with other small tribes, resulting in the development of strong predisposi-
tions towards in-group-oriented behavior. However, human evolution and history is marked by
a gradual expansion of our circle of moral consideration that transcends by far the narrow “in-
group” oriented human inner drives, going from the tribal level, to the nation level, to the level
of the human species in its entirety. Especially, the novel environment that emerged from modern
culture is characterized by a number of features and trends due to which the in-group syndrome
has largely become maladaptive, if not downright dangerous as a controlling mechanism for inter-
group relations.
Discussion point
An evolutionary based ethics needs to be of a universal nature, which means that moral rights and
responsibilities should relate to the whole human species.
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7. The need for revisiting moral guidelines regarding human relations
In the chapters on evolution-based specific ethical guidelines regarding human relations, we discuss
the issues according to the source of biosocial variation to which they pertain. They are hierarchically
classified according to their degree of complexity: (1) individual development (ontogeny), (2)
relations between individuals, (3) relations between groups, and (4) relations between generations
(phylogeny). For each domain, we consider subsequently the evolutionary background, develop-
ments in modernity, and evolution-based ethical guidelines.
7.1. Individual development
The central goal of evolutionary ethics—the furtherance of the hominization process in the context
of a progressing modernization with its increasing exigencies and opportunities for intellectual, artis-
tic and technological innovation—necessitates the maximization of the self-actualization of valuable
human-specific characteristics. Human societies have, more than ever before in history, a vested
interest in maximizing the human-specific potentialities of as many of their citizens as possible.
However, an evolutionary ethics requires promoting individuality, not individualism embedded
in competitive ethics. Furthermore, several individualistic drives leading to self-destructive or mala-
daptive behavior that decrease or impair valuable physical or mental characteristics need to be pre-
vented or suppressed.
The maximization principle regarding individual development is not in contradiction with the
principle of maintenance of a certain degree of genetic variation—between as well as within charac-
teristics—mainly as protection via genetic adaptability against changing environmental living
conditions.
Individual variability raises difficult and delicate questions of caretaking and care spending at the
extremes of some trait distributions. On the one hand, there are individuals who are phenotypically
—either due to genetic endowment, or to environmental accidents or life course events—less well
adapted to the novel environment of modern culture. On the other hand, there are people with
high creative or performance potentialities.
Discussion point
Phenotypically privileged persons need to be intensely trained in ethics in order to fully develop aware-
ness of their large social responsibilities and duties towards others and society in general. Persons with
high potential need to be supported to develop fully their potentialities.
7.2. Relations between individuals
We address four types of inter-individual relations: (1) age relations; (2) sex/gender relations; (3)
family relations; and (4) interpersonal relations between non-related people in general.
7.2.1. Age relations
Emphasizing the importance of caring for young and elderly people would only ram open doors, but
the modernization process requires emphasizing some particularities.
For youth, there is the pressing issue of the increasing gap between the earlier and accelerating
biological maturation time and the postponing and lengthening social maturation time, and the
necessity to prepare youngsters adequately to function in the novel environment of modernity.
For older age groups there are three major challenges: (1) ageism and active ageing; (2) increasing
life expectancy up to the species-specific biological potential; and (3) extending the life span beyond
the present species-specific range.
Individual and population ageing are inevitable outcomes of the modernization process and
should be welcomed. Consequently, ageism should be combated, and active ageing promoted.
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Efforts to further increase life expectancy up to the species-specific potential need to be associated
with efforts to extend health span, not just lifespan. Investing resources in increasing life expectancy
when senescent deterioration has gravely progressed, or when the dying process has irrevocably set
in, needs to be carefully evaluated from individual, family and societal points of view. This issue
evokes the delicate and difficult problem of death control: from an evolutionary point of view, the
furtherance of modernization, with its high and increasing standards of quality of life, should be
accompanied by the establishment of a broadly interpreted euthanasia legislation and practice in
case of hopeless or unbearable physical or mental deterioration, in particular at the initial and term-
inal stages of life.
Further extending the human-specific lifespan beyond the present potential makes sense, not only
from an ontogenetic point of view (because of our desire to live long and healthy), but also evolu-
tionarily, within the framework of a progressing hominization which, by definition, will be charac-
terized by a further expanding brain capacity. However, extending the human-specific lifespan up to
individual immortality would, in contrast, prevent any further evolution of our species to higher
levels of hominization. Immortality contradicts fundamentally any strivings for further hominiza-
tion, which requires intergenerational genetic change.
Discussion point
Prolonged education and entrance into paid work coincide currently with the early phases of family
formation, on the one side. On the other side, exit from paid work leaves many years of work free,
child free and socially inactive years after retirement. A further progressing modernization requires
rethinking of the current life course trajectories and personal and social expectations. Challenges linked
to the terminal phase of life and medically induced prolongation of the dying process also require new
ethical alignments.
7.2.2. Sex/gender relations
We argue that sexual ethics in a further modernizing context should be strongly equality- and
equity-oriented. Sexism of whatever nature or degree can no longer be justified as it is bla-
tantly maladapted in this stage of evolution. Related to this is the need for guaranteeing sex-
ual safety: in modernity, sexual assault, in whatever form—forced marriages, gender violence,
threats and harassments, abuse, genital cutting and rape—is a manifest form of evolutionary
regression.
Although we acknowledge that modern societies can accommodate a broad diversity in sex/gen-
der relations, we nevertheless conclude that the development of values and norms that promote
enduring and affectively based partnership should remain a goal of modern morality.
Although we are strongly in favor of freedom of expression, we also highlight that socially accep-
table contraints need to be placed upon commercial and exhibitionist abuse of some aspects of the
human sexual drive. Modern culture is often characterized by the promotion of exhibitionisms that
may become a feature of sexual violence.
Discussion point
Proper normative education and rigorous judicial punishment should guarantee sexual safety, in par-
ticular for women and children.
7.2.3. Family relations
The conclusions about future family relations largely run parallel with some guidelines for sex/gen-
der relations. Although modernity can afford the luxury of hosting a diversity in family relations, the
evolutionary perspective in the context of a further progressing modernization nevertheless leads to
the conclusion that the nuclear type of family, including enduring partnership and bi-parental
parent–children bonding, should be maintained and promoted as the preferential family model.
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Discussion point
Although grandparenting and reciprocal intergenerational care remain, from an evolutionary perspec-
tive, valuable aspects of extended family relations, social developments in modernity inevitably weaken
those relationships, which will have to be compensated by broader societal provisions.
7.2.4. Relations between non-related persons
Inter-individual relations in general which go beyond narrow genetic relationships are of particular
significance in modernity where nations include millions of people and inter-personal relations can,
with progressing globalization of human activities, go far beyond local community or national borders.
The ancient, evolutionary-grounded drives for inter-personal competition and co-operation are
still with us. Modernity is even pushing the realization of both drives, especially the competitive
drive, to unprecedented levels. The long-term negative consequences of this are probably underes-
timated. The need for increased forms of co-operation and reciprocal altruism keeps, at least at the
psychological level, insufficient pace with the modern incentives for competition.
The culture of greed that developed in agrarian societies, accelerated in industrial societies, and
continues to flourish in the present neo-liberal order has to be considerably contained in order to
avoid growing social inequalities and disastrous ecological consequences. Modern societies should
exert innovative efforts to develop, via their ethical pillars, educational systems, mass media, and pol-
icies, a strengthened social morality.
In modern society, violent and cheating behavior has become evolutionarily maladaptive: all
forms of bullying/delinquent/criminal behavior disturb normal social life and community welfare
and well-being. Whereas fair social policies can easily eradicate the social causes of antisocial behav-
ior, rapid progress in bio-medical sciences will soon allow complementing or even replacing tra-
ditional juridical punitive measures by psychotherapeutic and medical interventions that prevent
or remedy more biologically caused forms of antisocial/criminal behavior. With that said, the
improvement of moral education, training, and conditioning remains a crucial means for preventing
antisocial forms of behavior.
Discussion point
A further progressing modernization and hominization will have to keep competitive drives within
reasonable bounds and increase substantially the values and norms for co-operative behavior between
non-closely related individuals. In the culture of the future, the moral goal should be focused on sup-
porting the drive for individual self-actualization and inter-individual co-operation instead of inter-
individual competition.
7.3. Relations between groups
We distinguish three types of macro-scale group relations: (1) within-population group distinctions
characterized by differences in social status; (2) within- or between-population group distinctions
characterized by racial, ethnic, or ideological features; and (3) between-population differences
based on political organization.
7.3.1. Within-population relations and social status
Social hierarchies are a biologically unavoidable and have been and may be in the future socially necess-
ary phenomena that require strong community control. Indeed, modernity can be sustained and further
evolve when it is based on the principle of meritocracy. Segregation and recombination of genes entail
social re-assortment of talents across the different social strata in each generation in the population.
For reasons of individual fairness and social justice, a reasonable income range may need to be
accepted. Also, the current-day greed of many high-status actors, displayed in exuberant salaries
and bonuses that far exceed the most maximalist personal or family needs, should be contained. Per-
sonal assets have become the key status granting features.
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Elites—people who achieve superior intellectual, social, cultural, economic, and political excel-
lence in society—are of considerable importance in modernity, since they are responsible for
most of the benefits which distinguish our way of life from that of a few hundred years ago. However,
many modern elites fail to master our ancient drives toward selfishness, greed, and cheating, instead
enriching themselves disproportionately at the expense of their own and other populations.
Discussion point
Modern societies should increase substantially their efforts to heighten the moral sense of their elites
and contain present-day abuses. This could be achieved first and foremost by social valorization of
achievements rather than accumulation of personal assets.
7.3.2. Within-population relations with respect to race, ethnicity, worldview, or political
conviction
We distinguish four “other-than-social-status” group relations: (1) population-genetic differences,
often commonly referred to as racial differences; (2) ethnic differences, characterized by differences
in cultural traits such as language or customs; (3) differences in worldview, including religious and
various forms of non-religious beliefs; and (4) political conviction or adherence.
In pre-modern living conditions, such markers of group identity were very often and strongly
associated with discriminating forms of behavior linked to the in-group/out-group syndrome. In mod-
ernity, ancient innate drives toward nepotism, tribalism, ethnocentrism, racism, and xenophobia
became maladaptive. In a globalizing and unifying world, accepting and accommodating a greater bio-
logical, cultural, philosophical and political diversity has become a requirement for social bettering.
To the extent that ideological variants are consistent with universal human rights, accepting ideo-
logical pluralism is a necessity in modernity.
Discussion point
Ideological multiculturalism that wants to accommodate value and norm systems originating from
pre-modern cultural stages in human history is unacceptable, not only because it would introduce
elements for a regressive cultural development and biological evolution, but also because it would pre-
vent population groups that are still being indoctrinated with pre-modern value and norm systems
from fully integrating in modern societies.
7.3.3. Between-population relations
In the context of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the dysgenic and other effects of
modern warfare, all positive features of modernity—the eradication of mass hunger and disease,
health and social care, emancipation of women, democratic decision making, just to mention the
key ones—point to the absolute necessity for risk mitigation and prevention of warfare as a
means of resolving international conflicts.
The solution for improving the relations between populations is very simple, though probably
very difficult to realize. Simple, because there is only one solution, namely increase international,
intergovernmental co-operation; most difficult, because of the tenacity of the in-group/out-group
syndrome and the vested interests linked to it.
Globalization is the inevitable outcome of the modernization process whereby science and tech-
nology, commerce, culture and ideology are disseminated all over the planet, and the peoples of the
world become interdependent in all aspects of life conducive to a unified, co-operative and sustain-
able global society. Globalization currently has an ambiguous reputation, mainly due to the excesses
of the present runaway economic globalization characterized by insufficient world community con-
trol and the harsh neoliberal deregulation of commodity, capital and labor. Reputation notwith-
standing, a further progressing globalization is, ultimately, the only possible solution for
eliminating the remaining inequalities and inequities between the peoples of the world and for resol-
ving international conflicts.
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Discussion point
Given concerns about long-term challenges that threaten the future of the human species as a whole
and its home basis, planet Earth, we need to evolve to an efficient and powerful world governance.
7.4. Relations between generations
We deal with two major aspects of reproduction: quantitative and qualitative issues, and their mutual
interactions.
7.4.1. Quantitative issues
We consider the recent and expected future numerical growth of the human species to be the most
threatening challenge humankind is facing in the short run. Slowing down population growth is
necessary due to the following three facts: (1) the human species is already currently causing a pla-
netary ecological overshoot, estimated at 1.5 Earths, (2) virtually all human populations will want to
reach the developmental levels of the most advanced human societies, and (3) the most advanced will
want to further progress in wealth, welfare and wellbeing.
Due to the scientifically driven successful technological (medical and public health) control of
causes of natural mortality, the biological, behavioral and cultural drives towards inclusive fitness
maximization have become maladaptive—at least at the population or species level. Hence, the
demographic transition—the shift from high to low mortality and fertility levels—has to be com-
pleted as soon as possible. Mortality decline is obviously ethically desirable, whereas uncontrolled
fertility rates, wherever they still exist, need to be reduced to levels which would make population
increase manageable at the world scale. This is particularly pressing for the developing world. The
present demographic transition is characterized by a later but faster decrease of mortality and
slow decline in fertility rates. In developing countries, fertility rates that are much higher than during
the demographic transition in the old industrial countries coincide with aspirations for instantly
reaching Western levels of wealth, welfare and wellbeing.
In order for the entire world population to achieve cultural and economic welfare and wellbeing
levels of the most advanced regions, the numerical size of the world population will, despite ecolo-
gically improving economic production and consumption levels, have to temporarily be reduced to
levels that are sustainable given the planet’s carrying capacity.
The proposition defended by some that below-replacement fertility is, from an evolutionary point
of view, a maladaptive strategy, may perhaps be right from a strictly ethno-centric (or short-term)
point of view. However, from a population, or even a species point of view, at least in the context of
the present and expected future world population size and consumption pattern, it is a well-adapted
medium-term strategy. If the whole world would acquire the level of prosperity and welfare of the
most advanced nations with their current consumption patterns, it can be estimated that humanity
would need almost four Earths. Hence, if the quality of life of populations in developing regions
matches that of developed countries while the latter maintain or increase their quality of life levels,
it will be necessary to decrease the world population size to levels that would be ecologically sustain-
able in a long-term perspective.
Discussion point
Enhancing quality of life, i.e., achieving and furthering welfare and wellbeing, at the global level
necessitates a substantial temporary decrease of the world population size until ecological sustainabil-
ity has been achieved again. Achieving a zero world population growth is an urgent goal.
7.4.2. Qualitative issues
Ethical guidelines for qualitative aspects of reproductive behavior may have to include two comp-
lementary domains of action: euthenics and eugenics.
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7.4.2.1. Euthenic reproductive goals. In a modernizing context, with its strong mortality control, pro-
moting birth control is a must, not only because of demographic necessities, but also because it
increases quality of life by affecting sexuality, love, and female emancipation.
As far as birth limitation is concerned, for obvious reasons contraception ought to be favored
instead of induced abortion. Archaic infanticide has no place. Induced abortion as a matter of auton-
omous female decision is an important achievement of women’s movements. Legalized within the
framework of a good contraceptive and counseling policy, in order to minimize its prevalence, it
is a component of reproductive health.
Despite the considerable progress in contraceptive use that has been made in recent decades in
modernizing countries and regions, there is still a substantial unmet need, resulting in varying levels
of excess fertility. It prevails in particular in developing countries, and more generally among at risk
population groups such as adolescents, and less educated people who lack knowledge and access to
modern, efficient contraceptives.
In case people cannot have children naturally, modern methods of medically assisted reproduc-
tion can increasingly help people to satisfy their desire to have and raise children. The decision to
apply such technologies can nowadays take into account the biological or social risks they entail
for the offspring.
The very large family system is largely a maladapted remnant of the transition from a pre-modern
to a modern demographic regime. The phenotypic features of children from very large families often
contrast unfavorably to children from small or moderate family sizes.
Discussion point
A special challenge associated with very high fertility is growth ideology, which is usually promoted by
religious groups who argue against so-called unnatural interventions on reproductive potentials, or by
other groups who want to expand their influence and power through demographic expansion. Those
groups are in fact acting unethically, creating high costs for society as a whole.
7.4.2.2. Eugenic reproductive goals. Eugenics has two major goals: avoiding genetic harm to descen-
dants and promoting the reproduction of genetically determined or influenced human-specific fea-
tures, such as intelligence, sociability, physical attractiveness and performance, sexual potential,
longevity, and physical and mental health in general. In a long-term perspective, eugenics aims at
enhancement of the human genetic predispositions, thereby carrying forward the hominization
process.
Negative eugenics tries to reduce the existing mutational load in populations, to avoid increases of
deleterious genes, and to diminish the contraselective effects of selection-relaxing therapeutic medi-
cal practices and dysgenic patterns of differential reproduction.
Positive eugenics aims at establishing a positive relation between favorable genetic traits and
reproductive behavior using biotechnical interventions. Currently it is associated with medically
assisted reproduction, and in the future, it may lead to eugenic germinal engineering. The latter
implies correcting individual genetic impairments, and also enhancing the genes underlying charac-
teristics such as intelligence, emotionality, sociability, physical attractiveness, sexual performance,
physical abilities, longevity, and general health.
As far as concerns the delicate and difficult matter of eugenic decision-making, public as well as
expert opinion is still strongly divided.
Discussion point
We suppose the most optimal perspective would be (1) to favor an educational/agogic approach—
informing and motivating future parents to take a eugenic attitude in their reproductive decisions,
(2) to promote genetic counseling/genetic screening, (3) to leave in principle the ultimate decision to
individuals, and (4) to set societal limits to genetic choices which could harm the children’s
wellbeing.
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7.4.3. Quantitative vs. qualitative goals
At first sight, the recommendations concerning qualitative and quantitative reproductive behavior
in a further progressing modernization and hominization seem to be contradictory: on the one
hand, pleading for a generalization of quantitative birth control, bringing fertility levels temporarily
below replacement level; on the other hand, advocating genetic enhancement of the human species.
Limiting quantitative reproduction and at the same time enhancing qualitatively oriented repro-
duction are not at all contradictory or incompatible. Changing the genetic composition of a popu-
lation is a matter of differential reproduction, and this is independent from the existing or desired
demographic growth model. A qualitatively focused differential reproduction can be achieved in a
demographically shrinking as well as in an expanding population.
Discussion point
Human reproduction in the twentieth century was characterized by the massive shift from chance to
choice about the number of children—it was all about quantitative birth control. The twenty-first cen-
tury might see the rapid shift from chance to choice in matters of qualitative birth control and genetic
enhancement of the human species.
8. Reconciling traditional and modern ideologies with evolutionary goals
In the last chapter of the book we conclude with some final reflections on the need for religious and
secular ideologies to move into an evolutionary ethical direction and to promote interfaith and inter-
ideology dialogue.
Our analysis of the ethical goals of the traditional religious ideologies which we consider to be
largely maladapted to modernity, and the modern secular ideologies most of which we perceive as
fragmentary and incapable of providing a comprehensive response to the future evolution and devel-
opment of humanity, implies at first sight that the future of our species (and our planet) looks pretty
bleak.
Indeed, it can be expected that both the traditional religious belief systems and many modern
secular ideological beliefs will be with us for quite some time: the persistence of religious traditions
will continue to direct or influence the behavior of believers and play an important role in the lives of
many people. This is due to the neurological predisposition to think and feel spiritually, and/or the
power of religious institutions. Also, the diversity of modern fragmented secular ideologies, resulting
from individual or group interests or their incapacity to design a grand vision of the future, will con-
tinue to divide the minds and actions of many agnostic and atheist thinking people.
If we want to avoid further damage, there is not much time left to resolve some of our demo-
graphic and ecological challenges. Nevertheless, when looking at the relatively short historical
time span of the modernization process, there is room for moderate optimism. Modernization
has introduced many fundamental moral changes with extremely important consequences for a
higher quality of life of individuals and societies. For instance, in social life it is associated with indi-
vidual self-actualization, freedom of individual expression, expanding autonomy in personal
relations, humane labor regulations, abolition of slavery, female emancipation and equal gender
rights, family planning, environmental awareness, ideological pluralism and tolerance, democratic
governance, intergovernmental consultation and co-operation. Many of those modern moral and
political achievements have even been adopted by most traditional religions.
Nevertheless, traditional as well as secular ideologies face two major challenges: (1) to integrate a
long-term evolutionary ethical approach in their basic philosophies; (2) to move together, via inter-
faith and inter-ideology dialogue between the different religious belief systems, between different
secular ideologies and most of all between the traditional religious and the modern secular ideologies.
In both types of ideologies, there must be many open-minded people who, confronted with present-
day problems and taking into account scientific knowledge, are prepared to work together on societal
reforms that will secure higher levels of quality of life, welfare and wellbeing.
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Discussion point
A scientific approach, especially an evolutionary approach, to ethical questions might help to bring
together religious and secular ideologies to design a new global ethic that not only deals with the urgent
challenges humankind is currently facing, but also focuses on a longer-term future.
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Introduction
We are confrontedwith formidable crises in the twenty-first century, ranging frommassive habitat loss
(see UN, 2019), to divisive political and religious ideologies (e.g., McCoy & Somer, 2019), to human-
kind’s access toweapons of annihilation (Bryan&Victor, 2014). These crises, alongside others, threaten
our species’ future. They also render us, by some estimates (e.g., Sanderberg & Bostrom, 2008), with a
19% probability of going extinct by the end of the century. Given these odds, and the apparent urgency
of addressing the climate crisis alone (Future Earth, 2020), we may wonder: how can we as a species
overcome the existential challenges that threaten our future and much of the life on our planet?
The answer, according to Cliquet and Avramov in Evolution Science and Ethics in the Third Mil-
lennium, is advancing science and the influence of culture on human development by means of evol-
ution science. After all, evolution science, they argue, is necessary for illuminating pathways toward
adaptive cultural innovations and providing a rationale for developing a universal morality, a requi-
site for humankind’s future (p. v). Moreover, evolution science can serve as the foundation for, and
can synthesize the body of science that informs, the long-term survival of the human species
(pp. 221–28, 412).
Finding myself at the crossroads of human rights and science, I have taken great interest in Cli-
quet and Avramov’s book, especially as it concerns ethics. Here, I want to defend a qualified version
of Cliquet and Avramov’s main argument as what I will characterize as a metaethics for informing
how we think about morals, values and ethics in the twenty-first century. My discussion will proceed
as follows. Before offering a defense of their argument as a form of metaethics, I will first render my
understanding of Cliquet and Avramov’s central ideas. In so doing, I will also highlight some of the
more controversial arguments in their book, which are potential sources for scholarly debate. I will
then make the case that what Cliquet and Avramov have done well, and what constitutes the strength
of their book, is provide a comprehensive view of evolution science as a metaethical frame for con-
ceptualizing ethical decision-making in the third millennium.
Taking a broad evolutionary perspective
To defend the centrality of evolution science for ethics, Cliquet and Avramov draw widely from and
base much of their book on the first and second Darwinian Revolutions (e.g., Machalek & Martin,
2004; Wright, 1994). From these discoveries, Cliquet and Avramov claim, rather unobjectionably,
that evolution science provides key insights into human behavior (e.g., inclusive fitness, kin selection,
reciprocal selection, etc., pp. 1–84). Critical to their subsequent discussion, however, is the additional
claim that these insights entail factual support for deontic statements about ethical human conduct.
By ethics, then, the authors mean the study of what is good but also particular human actions, such as
cooperative social relations, and performative acts that are inspirational and necessary for advancing
hominization and modernization, including support for ecological sustainability, equity, and genetic
engineering (pp. 189–242).
In order to appreciate these claims, it will be helpful to understand a few underlying concepts.
Hominization is understood as the augmentation of cultural influences on ontogenetic development,
and any adaptive changes to genetics that contribute to human survival and the next stage of
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hominin evolution (pp. 208–9). Modernization is taken to mean the development of science—i.e.,
humankind’s cumulative knowledge and understanding of reality—which has complemented
changes in morality and allowed humankind to intervene effectively in society and the environment
(p. 14). For Cliquet and Avramov, advancing hominization and modernization is critical for both our
survival and morality. Morality is understood widely enough to include the values and principles
held by persons and communities, the ensemble of which comprises ethics or what people consider
good and bad (p. 17).
Accordingly, evolution science informs Cliquet and Avramov’s envisioned system of ethics which
is said to be capable of setting the phylogenetic enhancement of hominization and modernization as
its central goal, and the survival and adaptation of the species as the ultimate good (pp. 195, 402).
What is defended, then, is an evolution-based ethics, or, more precisely, ethical human conduct
based on scientific knowledge of such things as human cooperation (p. 36), naturally selected
moral sentiments (p. 44, 74), and adaption (p. 72). Some of the upshots of centering ethics on evol-
ution science is that it gives ethics a scientific foundation (p. 52); offers coherence to the complete
program of what it means to be human—i.e., genetic, developmental, and cultural factors
(p. 192); and provides sufficient breadth for a universal morality, as opposed to extant ingroup mor-
alities that limit human cooperation (p. 194). Evolution science is also the best way for us to under-
stand hominization itself and thus advance the science of modernization toward a holistic universal
morality that is capable of sustaining humankind (p. 175, 184, 209).
Controversial implications
There is much to admire about Cliquet and Avramov’s book, and several positive things could be
said about it, given its remarkable depth and extensive breadth. For sake of brevity, however, I
wish to focus on two issues before offering my defense of their argument as a form of metaethics.
These issues are as much caveats as they are criticisms that deserve further attention.
The first is that this book is a daring scientific and philosophical treatise, as the authors themselves
recognize (p. 192). Like most daring books, it is likely to promote a great deal of discussion and
debate among scientists and ethicists alike. A few arguments that are likely to garner attention are
that organized religion and religiosity are no longer adaptive (p. 132); that biology as a scientific dis-
cipline was responsible for social movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as
women’s liberation (pp. 171–72, 267); and that science is on its way to swallowing up cultural differ-
ences worldwide (p. 202). These are bold claims that serve as counterpoints to bodies of literature
defending the very opposite conclusions—for example, that religion in many environments is adap-
tive (e.g., Alcorta & Sosis, 2005; Matthews, 2012); that modern social movements played an equal
and reciprocal role in advancing science (e.g., Moore & Hoffman, 2013); and that skepticism
about science (Achenbach, 2015) and cultural diversity remain fairly prevalent worldwide (e.g.,
Celikkol et al., 2017; UNESCO, 2009).
Even bolder are Cliquet and Avramov’s arguments for controversial topics such as euthanasia in
the dying process (pp. 251–54), societal intervention in reproduction to prevent the spread of “weak
alleles” and dysgenic human qualities such as IQ deficiencies (p. 372), and a newly qualified form of
eugenics that promotes “favorable” genetic features (pp. 374–99). Critical readers may find these dis-
cussions alarming due to the cruel legacies left by social practices such as eugenics in the twentieth
century (e.g., eugenic sterilization in the United States ceased only in 1978; see U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, 1978). However, Cliquet and Avramov offer considerable argu-
ments in their defense. Such a defense reminds eugenics skeptics, like me, that despite wanting to
keep eugenics and talk of dysgenic-control buried in the dustbin of “bad science,” we cannot ignore
these issues, if only because advancements in science reintroduce them in new forms. For that
reason, Cliquet and Avramov’s daringness and interest in controversial topics invite fellow scholars
(and, arguably, force those of us who are otherwise skeptical or reluctant) to wrestle with difficult
questions at the intersection of evolution science and ethics. Granted, I disagree with Cliquet and
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Avramov’s inferences about these topics, but it is my hope that readers will at least engage their dis-
cussions with a balance of criticalness and understanding of the authors’ primary aim—again, to
approach a universal morality from the vantage point of evolution science.
The second and related thing I want to say is that Cliquet and Avramov’s notion of evolutionary
ethics could easily be misunderstood. The reason is that Cliquet and Avramov discuss evolution
science, the alleged centerpiece of their entire argument, as if it were already a burgeoning ethical
system, the foundation of or frame for ethics in general, and a necessary condition for a universal
morality in particular. Of course, these facets need not be mutually exclusive, and the authors pro-
vide interesting arguments for each. A critical reader may ask, however, whether Cliquet and Avra-
mov oversell evolution science by having it do all of these things. Can evolution science inform, serve
as the basis of, and function as the frame for a universal ethics?
In what remains of this article, I will argue that the strength of Cliquet and Avramov’s argument is
not in defending evolution science as an inclusive and complete science for ethics, but rather in posi-
tioning evolution science as the centerpiece for a metaethics that can inform meta-analyses of nor-
mative ethics. Attempting to do more, and in particular, elevate evolution science to the level of
ethics or reduce ethical concepts to evolution science leads to a potential bankruptcy of both evol-
ution as an objective field of study and ethics as a discourse grounded in moral reasoning. As I believe
the authors would ultimately agree, evolution science is a necessary frame for metaethics but not a
sufficient condition or source of content for normative ethics.
A system, foundation, or frame?
A common thread throughout Cliquet and Avramov’s book is the claim that evolution science can
inform morality and thereby function as a key part of a complete system of ethics. In defending this
claim, the authors provide an impressive and comprehensive review of evolution science, which
includes the modern synthesis (pp. 1–9); the evolutionary processes that contribute to human mor-
ality (pp. 19–43, 59–84); evolutionary theories of senescence (pp. 242–49); sex variability (pp. 258–
266); individual variability (pp. 277–81); interpersonal relations (pp. 288–95); kinship and family
(pp. 308–11); ingroup/outgroup relations (pp. 326–28); state relations (pp. 331–33); population
growth (pp. 341–42); and the history of evolutionary ethics (pp. 43–58). Building on this historical
overview, Cliquet and Avramov infer that an evolutionary ethics—i.e., a sound account of how evol-
utionary theory bears on morality and ethics—should account for the following: the evolutionary
foundation of morality, development of moral values, and influence of moral values on human evol-
ution (pp. 42–3).
It is difficult to dispute these three aims, or the role of evolution in shaping our morality. As the
authors aptly illustrate, our moral sentiments have a phylogenetic and ontogenetic history (p. 44),
and the particular morals we adopt depend heavily on our physiology, development, and encultura-
tion (see also Krebs, 2015). It is also clear that morality is a cultural adaptation (p. 8) for being a
functional member of a group (p. 63, 327). Thus, the authors echo Krebs (2011) in saying, “The func-
tion of concepts of morality is [indeed] to induce individuals to uphold the social orders of their
groups by constraining their selfish urges and biases” (p. 27; as cited by Cliquet & Avramov,
2018, p. 65).
However, being a sociable member of a group is not the only function of morality (see Fitspatrick,
2016). The historical persistence of moral innovations, including the development of universal pre-
scriptions, such as human rights, indicate that many moral precepts are derived from reflection and
moral reasoning. From an evolutionary standpoint, moral reasoning is likely a byproduct of other
cognitive adaptations, akin to acquired skills in reading, writing, and mathematics, including inno-
vations thereof (Street, 2006, pp. 142–43; as cited in Fitspatrick, 2016). It would seem, then, that our
morality, in the fullest sense, outstrips our natural inclinations toward ingroup cooperation—viz. it
surpasses the evolutionary foundations of moral dispositions, including our development and socia-
lization. In short, morality is more than our genetic, behavioral, and symbolic inheritance from
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previous generations (see Jablonka & Lamb, 2005) and involves moral reasoning about the good,
which we develop generationally as a science as much as an art relative to our particular time and
place.
The authors appear to appreciate this point, insofar as they draw from multiple moral arguments
and ethical systems (from religion to ecologism; see pp. 85–184) to defend their understanding of
what is good. For Cliquet and Avramov, the good is that which advances human adaptations; in par-
ticular, it is progressive hominization and modernization that leads to the survival of our species. To
attain this good, Cliquet and Avramov insist that we as a species require a universal morality, where
multiple communities and cultural systems work in harmony toward the next phase of human evol-
ution. Of course, this universal morality has yet to be attained—and that is an important point for the
critique that follows. For Cliquet and Avramov stress that their envisioned universal morality is
necessarily shaped and entailed by evolution science (pp. 185–242), but is nevertheless a morality
for which we ought to aspire (pp. 185–193, 239, 337, 402). I will suggest that the multiple com-
ponents promised by evolution science—i.e., entailing, being foundational for, and framing ethics
—is an oversell that blurs the line between description and prescription.
To illustrate, I wish to begin from the aspirational component, in which the authors implore evol-
utionaries to defend moral precepts that Cliquet and Avramov themselves claim are entailed by evol-
utionary science. Two such precepts are that we ought to increase human capabilities and decrease
both the human population and dysgenic qualities of humans everywhere. To adopt these precepts,
evolutionists are to draw from evolution science and secular philosophies, such as humanism, to con-
vince ethicists, religious leaders, and policy makers that decreasing the population and preventing
the spread of dysgenic qualities, such as those contributing to low IQ scores, is good (p. 399). The
background premises here are that evolution science informs both our current moral sensibilities
and the moral precepts we ought to adopt; and unlike other ethical systems, evolution science
can, in fact, bring together different ethical views by virtue of its consistency with science and nat-
uralism (p. 401). Hence, an additional background assumption to the entire argument is that morals
must be grounded in ideas of naturalism entailed by the sciences.
Building on these premises, Cliquet and Avramov spend a good amount of time defending the
notion that a marriage between evolution science and current ethical systems is indeed possible.
From a naturalistic standpoint, they argue that ethical systems are, after all, adaptations for social
living, and that various systems of ethics share a goal that is best explained by evolution science:
that is, humans must strive toward phylogenetic enhancements or cultural adaptations, such as
improving modes of cooperation and modernization (pp. 192–5, 402). Consequentially, one of
the highest ethical goods to follow from both evolution science and systems of ethics is that human-
kind must be prevented from going extinct, regressing, or stagnating (pp. 202–3). And evolutionists
ought to take the lead in achieving this good, given their expertise in evolution science, by working
with other ethicists and actively progressing hominin evolution (pp. 202–9).
These are remarkable ideas. The difficulty, however, is that Cliquet and Avramov often refer to
insights from evolution science, including its link to deontic implications, as if evolution constituted
a set of beliefs already capable of informing humankind of solutions to present-day crises (e.g.,
pp. 402–5). Yet, the authors say elsewhere that evolution science can serve as a foundation for a uni-
versal morality (pp. 44, 402), and also function as a frame for considering ethical matters (p. 192).
Perhaps evolution science can do all of these things—but I have my doubts. The fact that Cliquet and
Avramov’s universal morality is one for which we ought to aspire entails that evolution broadly
defined does not entail all of the precepts they defend. After all, that we ought to aspire to a morality
informed by evolution science requires the authors to import from elsewhere the very deontic claim
that is supposed to follow from evolution science. Put simply, even if evolution entails goods that are
worth pursuing, the claim that we ought to then value those goods for the sake of humankind is an
additional deontic claim not provided by evolution science. Further, a defense of active neo-Malthu-
sian practices is neither entailed by evolution science nor is it a given that it is good. Further still, the
claim that evolution science can, in fact, bring together ethical systems to forge a universal morality
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for humankind is an empirical one for which there is currently no evidence. As a result, I have serious
doubts about Cliquet and Avramov’s utopian view that evolution science is the panacea that will
unite humanity and save us from extinction.
It seems to me the authors have offered three possibilities for evolution science: it is the heart of an
envisioned ethical system, a foundation for a possible universal morality, or a frame for considering
ethics. Regarding these, the one that appears to work best, which is the soundest and least proble-
matic is the third option: evolution science can inform a metaethics for evaluating how we think
about ethical decision-making in the twenty-first century.
Facing up to the is/Ought problem
Cliquet and Avramov offer several reasons for prioritizing evolution science in their system of ethics.
Here are a few of the most important: humankind requires (1) ongoing exo-somatic, cultural inter-
ventions to achieve optimal biological functionality, (2) mastery of inter-individual and inter-group
relations, and (3) cultural evolution of innovations to control critical adversities such as disease, war,
and environmental destruction (p. 192). They add that without evolution science, we would struggle
to attain these prerequisites for survival, to understand ethics as natural phenomena (p. 48), or to
address ethical problems arising from evolutionary mismatches (p. 194). The underlying logic is
that because ethical behavior results from natural selection, morality is itself natural (pp. 19–25,
48). And we are finally at a stage in our history when we can use evolution science to enact culture,
thereby overcoming evolutionary mismatches (p. 194), ensuring that the human species adapts to
changing environments (p. 405), and advancing hominization and modernization (p. 412).
It is indisputable that ethics is the product of both genetic and cultural evolution (p. 19), and that
ethical ideas, like genetic variants, are subject to selective pressures that we can now partially manip-
ulate (p. 25). Even then, while evolution science provides us with a way of manipulating nature in our
own favor, and even explains ethics naturalistically, it is not a given that it offers an ethics that we
ought to practice—or that an ethics derived from evolution science entails the prescriptions that Cli-
quet and Avramov say it does.
As an illustration, one could produce an equally robust account of love from an evolutionary per-
spective. Such an account might, like Cliquet and Avramov’s book, explain love’s evolutionary
underpinnings and also point to ways of manipulating our environments for having greater com-
passion for others or even more intense romantic relationships with partners (e.g., see Sternberg
&Weis, 2006). An author may even say that he or she has derived certain ethics from an evolutionary
description of love—for instance, that we ought to practice free love. Yet, unlike descriptive claims,
which are based on facts, ethical precepts are often open questions (Moore, 1903). That is, when
someone tells us “X is good” or “we ought to do X,” we find ourselves asking whether the purported
precept is indeed good, and unlike a descriptive claim, we cannot easily verify the precept by con-
sulting facts, figures, or investigations. Rather, we must also deliberate about it. Returning to the
example of love, it would therefore be an open question whether the precept “we ought to engage
in free love” was entailed by the evolutionary description of love; and the description itself would
not automatically entail that the precept is something we ought to do universally, let alone practice
individually.
More critically, when it comes to evolutionary accounts of ethics, it is often the case that the the-
orist claims to advocate ethical principles that are derived from evolution science, but these deri-
vations require remarkable leaps in logic from description to prescription. Upon scrutiny, in
worst case scenarios, these derivations are little more than the theorist defending his or her prefer-
ences or prejudices with so-called evolutionary justifications (viz. Social Darwinism).
For example, several theorists seem to believe that eugenics is implied by evolution science,
including Cliquet and Avramov (pp. 374–99). However, I have yet to see a convincing argument
to the effect that eugenics follows from the descriptive claims of evolution science. In all cases,
eugenic arguments stem from a premise outside of science. In Cliquet and Avramov’s case, it is
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the premise that progressive hominization requires a bioprogram in which individuals control the
propagation of their own dysgenic qualities in order to benefit the ontogenetic and phylogenetic
development of humankind (pp. 232–33). The key premises here are that (1) we ought to advance
human ontogenetic and phylogenetic evolution and (2) we cannot do it without controlling for dys-
genic qualities. Those premises are often taken as first principles for proponents of eugenics but are
not a given from evolution science.
To see why, recall that natural selection and evolution are neutral, and whatever goods or values
we claim to derive from descriptions of evolutionary processes are actually based on ethical systems
we import into them. In other words, a naturalistic description of why and how a suite of behaviors
evolved does not entail deontological prescriptions for how we should relate to them. Furthermore,
evolution science may shed light on how we do behave, but it does not tell us how we ought to
behave.
This is the classic problem summarized by Hume’s guillotine and G.E. Moore’s naturalistic fal-
lacy, and Cliquet and Avramov attempt to dissolve it in their book (pp. 46–50). Nevertheless, instead
of providing a defense against it—which I believe is necessary for the soundness of key parts of their
argument—the authors simply wave the problem away. They do so by substituting a novel defense
with blanket appeals to Wilson (1998) and Steven Pinker’s (2002) assertions that there is no is/ought
problem after all (p. 47). For appealing to the “is/ought problem,” they claim, commits the fallacy of
assuming that “ought” implies “is,” and also overvalues the fraught system of cultural relativism.
They also add that “if ethics could not be based on facts, what is left for justifying moral principles?”
(p. 48). Thus, they do not take on the difficult problem of leaping from description to prescription or
explain why ethical claims are unjustified if not based on natural facts, but instead engage in a tu
quouque appeal.
As much as I admire Cliquet and Avramov’s overall book, their section on Hume’s guillotine and
Moore’s naturalistic fallacy is, unfortunately, shallow. Making the leap from fact to norm is a notor-
ious problem in normative ethics (e.g., Black, 1964; Machery &Mallon, 2010), and Cliquet and Avra-
mov’s project requires that they help us face up to the “Is/Ought” problem instead of glossing over it.
Admittedly, Hume and Moore’s challenges are not without their own shortcomings (e.g., Boyd,
1988), and the description-to-prescription challenge is not insurmountable. My point is that without
a sturdier bridge from the facts of evolution science to the deontic prescriptions of ethics, it is unclear
whether Cliquet and Avramov’s argument, which attempts to posit a universal morality centered on
evolution science, is sound.
Do morals need a naturalistic foundation?
Another critical point in Cliquet and Avramov’s argument is the claim that “modernity lacks a secu-
lar worldview that gives meaning and purpose to human existence and continuity” and that “the
fragmented modern secular ideologies lack a grand and holistic vision leading to an inclusive mor-
ality” (p. 185). Be that as it may, the connecting premise from this idea to their main conclusion—viz.
that a universal morality would entail advancing hominization and modernity—is that “evolution
science […] provides a solid, naturalistic basis for embedding values and norms,” without which
we could not “secure a safe and progressive future” (p. 402). While evolution science can help us
analyze ethics (as I discuss below), it is difficult to see how evolution science could offer a new, global
ethic that would overcome humankind’s leanings toward ingroup morality (p. 152), while simul-
taneously providing the groundwork to secure our future (p. 153). Accomplishing all of these
lofty goals—uniting humanity’s various moralities, bringing humankind together, and serving as
the very steppingstone to the species’ future—is much to expect from evolution science. Given its
aptness to explain why we have morals, it would rather seem that instead of serving as the critical
foundation or necessary condition for a universal morality, evolution science provides the securest
explanatory framework for why we would adopt certain values such as humanism (pp. 176–81), eco-
logism (pp. 181–84) and ecological sustainability (pp. 196–98). It can also shed light on how we
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innovate culture to bring about the better angels of ourselves, so to speak. Whether it can unite
humanity’s morals, and humankind in general, is yet to be seen.
Hence, a lingering two-part question I have for Cliquet and Avramov is: Do we need a naturalistic
foundation for our universal morals; and if a moral precept is not entailed by evolution science, does
it not have value? For instance, let us suppose that we find no evolutionary foundation for the core
precept of human rights, namely, that every person—regardless of their allelic qualities and whether
they possess significant dysgenic features—has dignity, and is therefore deserving of inalienable
human rights (UDHR; see UN General Assembly, 1948). If this is inconsistent with evolution science
(which I believe the authors would say it is; see p. 191), are we then to disregard such a moral pre-
cept? I should think not. However, if Cliquet and Avramov believe we should, then something is
amiss. Either evolution science cannot serve as the foundation for universal morality, or the universal
morality provided by naturalistic explanations is, again, not one we ought to adopt.
A metaethics worth considering
The real strength of Cliquet and Avramov’s argument, I believe, is that they offer a formidable evol-
utionary metaethics. At various points in their discussion, the authors depart from an ethics strictly
grounded in evolution science and instead argue for a combination of evolution with secular moral
ideologies. When doing so, they brilliantly illuminate what ethical statements, properties, and atti-
tudes are: they are adaptations for social life. That is an important insight and arguably the best
frame for considering ethics. What is more, an evolutionary explanation of ethics can be combined
with Enlightenment ideals, humanism, and modern philosophy to help us understand what is good
and what is bad (pp. 198–99). Thus, Cliquet and Avramov provide an explanation of evolution
science as a window through which we can consider extant moral systems and analyze our current
and future moral decision-making.
Accordingly, at the strongest points in their book, Cliquet and Avramov appear to outline a
robust evolutionary metaethics: a philosophical exercise that positions one’s ethical analysis above
normative ethics, which concerns prescriptive questions such as “What ought we to do?”, and
focuses instead on descriptive queries such as “What is morality?” or “How can we distinguish
the good from what is bad?” A great deal of metaethics, to the detriment of the discipline, has
excluded evolutionary theory from its analytical tools until the last two decades (for exceptions,
see Greene, 2008; Haidt, 2001). Since then, evolutionary metaethics has gained footing among
semantic metaethical views, such as noncognitivism, and aligns well with moral anti-realism. In
line with these theories, Cliquet and Avramov provide a convincing answer to the metaethical ques-
tion, “What is goodness?” Viewed through the window of evolution science, the good is not a prop-
erty in the world independent of humans (something that has bogged down metaethics), but rather
that which concerns hominization and modernization, including the ecological underpinnings for
human survival. This is an informed vantage point for metaethics which connects the most powerful
theory in science to the study of ethics. Yet, to stress one of my central points, metaethics is not con-
cerned with answering what we ought to do, but rather with how to think about that which we are
doing when we make normative claims, thereby helping us understand normative ethics. By defend-
ing the view that normative ethics concerns adaptations to social life, Cliquet and Avramov advance
an evolutionary metaethics that is indeed worth considering.
Conclusion
There is much to say about Cliquet and Avramov’s book, and what I have highlighted here only
scratches the surface. Given the limitations of such a review, I did not address equally interesting
ideas such as the hominization process from Australopithecines to Homo sapiens sapiens (p. 9),
or the details of Cliquet and Avramov’s argument for advancing hominization alongside moderniz-
ation. Equally as fascinating are their finer points about moral systems such as spirituality, atheism,
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and nationalism. What I have concentrated on, instead, is the book’s central issue: namely, taking a
broad perspective of evolution science. I argued that this viewpoint, as defended by Cliquet and
Avramov, leads to some potentially controversial claims and open questions regarding the coherence
and foundation of evolution science for ethics. Nevertheless, what Cliquet and Avramov do, which is
admirable and strongly defensible, is offer a robust case for an evolutionary metaethics.
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A moral obligation to promote future human evolution?
Michael E. Price
Centre for Culture and Evolution, Brunel University London, Uxbridge, Middlesex, UK
Introduction: evolutionary science can help us achieve the future we want, but how
could it tell us what future we should want?
There is much to admire in the target article, and the book on which it is based (Cliquet & Avramov,
2018). I certainly endorse using evolutionary science to understand the biology, psychology, culture
and morality of modern humans; to make any sense at all of our biocultural present, we must under-
stand how and why this present was created by the evolutionary past. Despite my enthusiasm for
using evolutionary science to understand human affairs, however, I am less sure of its suitability
as the basis for an ethical/moral system. The target readings provide an excellent exploration of
this suitability, but having considered their perspective, I still have some questions.
Before saying more about these questions, I should make one clarification. I have done a lot of
research on the evolution of cooperation and morality (e.g., Price, 2006; Price et al., 2002, 2014,
2017), but contrary to the target book (Cliquet & Avramov, 2018, p. 37), I did not author the
Price Equation. I wish I could take credit, but George Price (1970, 1972) came up with his famous
formalization of multilevel selection before I was even born.
Now let me characterize my own thinking on evolution and ethics, so I can point out how it
converges and diverges with the authors of the target readings. I regard evolutionary science as
relevant to ethics primarily because by learning about the origin and evolution of morality in
past environments, we empower ourselves to change moral behavior, if need be, to maximize
its adaptedness to present environments. The more we know about why a morally-charged behav-
ior – such as engaging in reciprocity, or respecting a food taboo – arose and persisted in the past,
the better we can assess that behavior’s relevance in present environments, which may be radically
different from those in which it evolved. Further, by learning about human adaptations for all
kinds of behavior, both morally desirable and otherwise, we empower ourselves to promote the
good and suppress the bad. Humans, for instance, appear to have some adaptations for violent
conflict, and others for peaceful dispute resolution (McCullough, 2008; Pinker, 2011). The more
we understand how these different categories of psychological mechanisms are elicited by different
kinds of environmental information, the more able we will be to discourage violence and encou-
rage peace.
I believe the authors of the target readings would agree with my views expressed so far, as they
often reflect on how some morally-charged behaviors seem better-adapted to environments of the
past than to those of the present. They also emphasize that by applying what we know about the
evolved nature of human morality, we put ourselves in the best possible position to overcome the
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severe global challenges that currently confront our species. So to a significant extent, the authors
and I are on the same page: we agree that evolutionary science can help us to make sense of
human morality and to improve the future for ourselves and generations to come.
The authors also seem to believe, however, that evolutionary science can not only help us create
the future we want, but also tell us what kind of future we should want, and this is where their logic
becomes more difficult for me to follow.
How could the evolutionary process be progressive in any moral sense?
I agree with the authors that evolution can be seen as essentially “progressive”, in the sense of moving
in the direction of increasing complexity. In apparent (though not actual) contradiction with the
second law of thermodynamics, evolution specializes in discovering and creating innovative and
highly-ordered solutions to problems of existence and reproduction, and these solutions (e.g., geneti-
cally-encoded adaptations) take on increasingly complex and functionally-specialised forms as evol-
ution proceeds through time (Campbell & Price, 2019; Heylighen, 1999). However, evolutionarily-
generated increases in functional complexity are not widely-regarded as progressive in any moral
sense. Although arguments have in fact been made for the moral goodness of increasing and main-
taining complexity in the world (Vidal & Delahaye, 2019), “thou shalt promote complexity” has not
shown up as a fixture of many human moral codes.
There is also no widely-accepted scientific explanation for how the evolutionary process in gen-
eral could be goal-directed in any teleological or teleonomic sense. Evolution does of course create
adaptations that are goal-directed in a teleonomic sense (e.g., the evolved function of eyes is to see),
but by what logic could we regard the evolutionary process in general as being goal-directed? A
deflating balloon moves in the direction of decreasing volume, but does this mean the balloon has
the “goal” of minimizing its volume? Maybe increased complexity would be most appropriately
regarded not as evolution’s goal, but as its unavoidable by-product, analogous to exhaust fumes gen-
erated by an engine.
The authors, however, do regard the evolutionary process as goal-directed in a teleonomic sense
(Cliquet & Avramov, 2018, p. 229), and they cite this perspective as justification for a moral system
focused on the furtherance of human evolution. Specifically, they suggest that the “central goal of
evolutionary ethics” is “the furtherance of the hominization process in the context of a progressing
modernization with its increasing exigencies and opportunities for intellectual, artistic and techno-
logical innovation” (target article, p. 8). The authors seem to see this central goal as one that should
be shared by people in general, but can we actually regard it as desirable in any objective sense?
Maybe I have missed some crucial aspect of the argument here, but I cannot see why we should.
Does evolution “care”, in the sense that a deity might care, if we help it to generate more complexity
in the future? Of course not: evolution has no mind, it’s just a concept we use to describe what hap-
pens in the world as replicator frequencies change over time. And if evolution does not and cannot
have any goals or cares, how could it have created an obligation for our species to pursue any moral
goals in particular?
Despite my questions about how evolution could be goal-directed, I actually do tend to agree with
the moral vision espoused by the authors; their proposed moral strategy for achieving a liveable
human future seems basically reasonable to me. The subjective appeal of this vision notwithstanding,
it is not clear to me why we should regard it as being mandated, validated, or endorsed by any aspect
of conventional evolutionary science. The authors’ perspective on human affairs is clearly informed
by evolutionary knowledge, but is the moral vision they espouse really the only one which could logi-
cally follow from this knowledge? Not as far as I can tell. “The furtherance of the hominization pro-
cess” seems like a subjectively preferable goal for us to have in many ways, but how are we justified in
portraying it as anything more than only that? How can we portray it as the goal not just of ourselves
but of evolution, as if the evolutionary process in general could actually have an overarching goal?
Don’t such portrayals just promote a misunderstanding of how evolution works?
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Evolution potentially could be goal-directed, but only if it itself evolved through
some meta-natural-selection process
Another way my own views relate closely to those of the authors is that I actually have endorsed
the view that the biocultural evolutionary process in general could be goal directed. I have also
emphasized, however, that such goal-directedness could exist only if biocultural evolution were
itself the functional product of some “meta-natural-selection” process (Wright, 2000, p. 316).
In a theoretical scenario of cosmological natural selection (Smolin, 1992), for example, the evol-
ution of intelligent life could itself be selected – as the developmental subroutine of a universe’s
phenotype – for the ultimate function of enabling that universe to reproduce (Gardner, 2000;
Price, 2017, 2019). In such a scenario, the evolution of intelligent life would be goal-directed in
the same sense that any organismal adaptation is goal-directed, that is, it would have some func-
tion (i.e., teleonomic purpose) “designed” into it by evolution. In the absence of some such meta-
natural-selection process, however, there is no natural way that biocultural evolution could be
directed towards any pre-programmed teleonomic goal. This is true because evolutionary selec-
tion is itself the only known natural process that is capable of generating goal-directed
functionality.
Ideas about “cosmological natural selection with intelligence” (Smart, 2009) and other meta-natu-
ral-selection scenarios are, of course, highly speculative. Nevertheless, if we do not allow for the
possibility that such processes could potentially occur, we will have no naturalistic basis for specu-
lating that biocultural evolution could potentially be goal-directed. The authors of the target article
do not, however, mention any such meta-selective process in their efforts to justify their teleonomic
perspective on the hominization process.
Conclusion: a reasonable moral vision with no clear scientific justification
In summary, although I have few subjective qualms about the authors’ moral ideals, I cannot
understand how these ideals follow logically from conventional evolutionary science. In particu-
lar: by what tenet of this science are we justified in basing our moral values on an observed pattern
of the evolutionary process? Perhaps we can assume that evolution really is goal-directed, and that
increased complexity is more than just its accidental by-product; perhaps, for example, the
further evolution of intelligent life actually is a pre-programmed, and hence highly probable
and predictable, outcome of this process. If so, we might be well-advised to try and live in har-
mony with evolutionary progress, if for no other reason than to self-interestedly align ourselves
with the currents of biocultural change that are likely to ultimately prevail. Such goal-directedness
in evolution, however, necessarily implies a meta-natural-selection scenario such as cosmological
natural selection with intelligence (Price, 2017, 2019). Such scenarios are not widely discussed in
academia, and it would have been unconventional for the authors to emphasize their relevance, so
it is not surprising that they did not do so. But the authors do believe evolution moves in a morally
progressive direction, and as they provide no unconventional evolutionary justification for this
belief, they presumably see it as somehow justified by conventional evolutionary science. I am
puzzled, however, about why they would see it this way.
None of my reservations reduce the subjective appeal of the authors’moral vision, or suggest that
this vision is especially incompatible with evolutionary science. My reservations do question the
assumption, however, that their proposed moral system is especially mandated by evolutionary
science, more so than any other moral system that our species has so far devised.
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Evolutionary ethics and adaptive atheism
F. LeRon Shults
Institute for Global Development and Social Planning, University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway
In Evolution Science and Ethics in the Third Millennium (2018), whose key arguments are summa-
rized in the target article above, Cliquet and Avramov offer an exacting and extensive analysis of the
ethical and ecological challenges and psychological and political choices ahead for the human
species. They bravely tackle a host of touchy issues and, in light of empirical findings and theoretical
developments within a wide variety of scientific disciplines, courageously offer their own construc-
tive proposals. Some of the latter (such as those dealing with eugenics and euthenics) will no doubt
generate fresh anxiety about genetic and social engineering, while others (such as those dealing with
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modernization and hominization) will fuel worries about scientism or elitism. Although these con-
cerns should lead us to be cautious, the authors remind us that we ought to be at least as concerned
about ways in which the well-being of future generations could be threatened by our failure to act
and our unwillingness to contest maladaptive cognitive and coalitional biases.
In this article, I address some of the touchiest issues raised in the book related to religious and
secular ideologies and offer my own comments and constructive proposals in response to three of
the “discussion points” that the authors lay out in their target article. Each of these points relates
explicitly to the potential roles of religion, naturalism or secularism in responding to the global chal-
lenges facing humankind and constructing an ethics grounded in evolutionary science. Along the
way, I will explain where and why I agree – or disagree – with the authors’ own discussion of
these points.
In their book, Cliquet and Avramov (2018) operationalize religion as involving “the belief in a
supernatural agent or power that created the universe, explains its existence and meaning, and
often imposes a moral code according to which humans should behave” (p. 89). Although “creator”
gods are not central within all religions, especially in small-scale societies, the authors’ definitional
emphasis on beliefs in and behaviors guided by putative supernatural agents and authorities is con-
sistent with the general consensus among scholars working across disciplines in the scientific study
of religion (Atran, 2002; Boyer, 2002; Shults, 2018a; Teehan, 2010; Tremlin, 2010). In the target
article, they invite commentators to respond to their suggestion that religion is no longer adaptive
in our contemporary environment.
Discussion point 4: Spirituality/religiosity is part of the human biological heritage that, together with its cultural
expressions in the hunter-gatherer and agrarian stages of human history, had adaptive functions in those stages.
However, many present cultural remnants of those stages are no longer well adapted to the exigencies of mod-
ernity. They are insufficiently robust to further develop the potential of the human species to reach higher levels
of cultural development and biological evolution. (Cliquet and Avramov 2020, p. 3)
The authors are even more explicit about the maladaptiveness of religion in their book. After review-
ing wide swaths of the relevant scientific literature across disciplines, they conclude that “organized
religions and religiosity based on beliefs and in-group morality transmitted though religious insti-
tutions are no longer instruments of human survival. They ceased to be adaptive to human survival
and have become maladaptive instruments” (2018, p. 134). As Cliquet and Avramov make clear
throughout their book, it is the supernatural (non-naturalist) aspects of religious beliefs and beha-
viors that are problematic in our contemporary context. Why? Because such pre-scientific beliefs
and in-group behaviors hinder modernization and enhanced hominization, which they argue are
necessary for responding to the ethical and ecological challenges of the third millennium. As they
note in the target article, “there is not much time left to resolve these urgent problems if we want
to avoid further damage” (p. 17).
Here I am in complete agreement with the authors. Their arguments about the deleterious con-
sequences of the superstitious beliefs and segregative behaviors promoted by religion are backed by
empirical findings from a wide array of disciplines, which I have also surveyed in other contexts
(Shults, 2014, 2018a). We are indeed running out of time to address the global challenges of the
Anthropocene such as extreme climate change, escalating cultural conflict, and excessive consumer
capitalism (Shults, 2015). The acceleration of these three latter crises has had a more profound nega-
tive impact in the Global South, where religion plays a powerful role in decreasing openness to scien-
tific solutions to sustainable development and in increasing social conflict and economic inequality.
As Rumy Hasan argues in Religion and Development in the Global South (2017), belief in doc-
trines related to putatively supernatural agents is
necessarily in tension with cognitive thinking for the simple reason that faith obviates the need for evidence and
to a significant extent for rational thinking; hence, cognitive faculties are diminished. Criticism, curiosity, criti-
quing, hypothesizing, theorizing, experimentation and the search for evidence all appear to be suppressed or
discouraged. To put it another way, they are not required or desired when truth is thought to emanate from
holy texts. (2017, p. 198)
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The evidence discussed by Hasan suggests that minds that are not secularized “are infused with
supernatural and irrational thinking, and these powerfully militate against the dynamics of growth,
development and the uplifting of people” (2017, p. 211).
Here it is important not to avoid the touchy issue of the negative correlation between religion and
intelligence, which has been well-documented in the scientific literature (Dutton & Van der Linden,
2017; Ganzach & Gotlibovski, 2013; Zuckerman et al., 2013). Although Cliquet and Avramov focus
heavily on the implications of religiosity for fertility and the carrying capacity of the Earth, they do
not address the effect that high fertility among the religious could have on the intelligence of the
human species at the population level. As Ellis et al. point out, both religiosity and intelligence
are substantially influenced by genetics and “persons with lower IQs and who are most religious
are reproducing at substantially higher rates than those who are least religious,” which leads them
to predict that as religiosity increases “average intelligence will decline” (2017, pp. 3–4). This is pro-
blematic because adapting to current ecological challenges calls for reasoning in “logical empirically
verifiable terms” about complex natural phenomena without “invoking supernatural ‘shortcuts’,”
which in turn “requires genes for high intelligence and is facilitated by genes for low religiosity”
(p. 15).
Like Cliquet and Avramov, Hasan also points to the positive relationship between widespread
religious behaviors motivated or justified by allegedly supernatural authorities and socio-economic
dysfunction, a correlation that has also been well-attested in the literature (Paul, 2009; Zuckerman,
2010). Hasan provides cross-cultural evidence clearly showing that “as countries develop, the impor-
tance of religion to the population-at-large declines – to the point that a significant percentage self-
proclaim to be non-believers and for a rising majority, religion is a declining or unimportant part of
their life” (p. 207). He argues that these findings compel us to acknowledge that if the countries of the
Global South are to become developed, they
must downplay the role of religion in people’s lives and institutions writ large and move towards secularizing
culture and society. This is not only essential for the cognitive development of children but is also a rational
approach to the tasks necessary for economic development and modernization. (p. 210)
Correlation is not causation. True, but a host of other scientific studies (e.g., psychological exper-
iments involving priming and other manipulations, structural equation models, and agent-based
computer models) have plausibly established reciprocal causal connections among variables related
to religious beliefs and behaviors and variables related to problematic traits such as tendencies
toward mistaken teleological judgments, ontological confusion, risk aversion, existential insecurity,
prejudice, racism and sexism. Especially under stressful or emotionally arousing conditions, thinking
about supernatural agents can activate segregative behaviors and engaging in religious practices can
activate superstitious beliefs. In other words, religious credulity biases that foster mistaken beliefs
about human-like supernatural forces (whether animal-spirits, ancestor-ghosts or deities like Xiuh-
tecuhtli, Yahweh or Zeus) and religious conformity biases that foster antagonistic attitudes and beha-
viors toward out-group members are mutually reinforcing. For a review and theoretical integration
of much of the literature that supports these claims see (Shults, 2018a).
Is religion maladaptive today? Yes, if by religion we mean beliefs and behaviors related to super-
natural agents and authorities, and if by maladaptive we mean not conducive to the mid- to long-
term survival or flourishing of the human species. The authors of the target article are correct in
their assertion that evidence from across scientific disciplines suggests that religious traits hinder
modernization and are increasingly maladaptive for responding to the ethical and ecological chal-
lenges of our contemporary global environment.
Religion is a big part of the problem but is “secularism” the solution? Here too, a great deal
depends on how we define and operationalize our terms. Cliquet and Avramov find most major
secular ideologies (such as liberalism, socialism, feminism and nationalism) to be too fragmented,
too short-sighted, and too focused on the macro-level. They are more optimistic about humanism
and ecologism than other secular ideologies, but all of the latter are found wanting for the task of
28 F. L. SHULTS
constructing a universal ethics based on evolutionary science. This is the concern behind the fourth
issue in relation to which they invite readers into conversation.
Discussion point 5: The current fragmented and mostly short-term perspective of modern secular ideologies are
no valuable alternative to the traditional religions as all encompassing, cohesive and integrated worldviews, with
a set of guiding values and norms. (Cliquet and Avramov 2020, p. 4)
In their book, the authors more clearly indicate that what they have in mind is a comprehensive “uni-
versal morality” or “universal ethics” to guide the whole human species into the future (2018, p. 185).
At this point, some will no doubt express concern about the possibility – or even desirability – of
such ethical universality. It is hard to imagine a non-coercive way to achieve this goal. Moreover,
the goal itself seems to presuppose – or at least leave room for – some form of moral realism or a
transcendent ground for human values, which are tied to the sort of religious notions that have
led us into the ethical impasses that constrain most contemporary moral philosophical discourse
(Marks, 2016).
Others will resist the notion that religious ideologies can actually provide comprehensive, coher-
ent or integrated worldviews. I have yet to come across one that even comes close to meeting these
criteria. Religious philosophers and professional theologians work hard to articulate consistent and
intelligible versions of their in-group’s religious worldview, but insofar as such worldviews are based
on the putative revelation of counter-intuitive, ontologically confused intentional forces that are
allegedly accessible through ritual manipulations conducted and controlled by in-group elites, the
“set of guiding values and norms” that actually operates within the lived religion of most laypeople
is primarily oriented toward maintaining credulity about the existence and relevance of the in-
group’s supernatural agents and conformity to the idiosyncratic social prescriptions and proscrip-
tions of the in-group’s supernatural authorities.
In this context, however, I would like to focus on the way in which Cliquet and Avramov frame
the issue of the relationship between “religious” and “secular” ideologies, and the relationship of both
to “naturalism.” Here I am only in partial agreement with the authors, but I believe the difference
between us is mostly rhetorical. Nevertheless, as will become clear when we examine Discussion
point 8 below, formal differences in framing and operationalization are important because they
can lead to material differences in strategies for addressing the challenges they identify.
Although the authors do not explicitly define “naturalism,” they are clearly fans. They argue that
every scientific discovery, in a wide variety of domains from astronomy to sociobiology,
has confirmed or even strengthened the scientific approaches and refutes the religious belief systems. The com-
mon feature of the findings in those scientific disciplines is that the supernatural, immaterial or spiritual
approaches and explanations of religions have been refuted and are replaced by natural and material
approaches and explanations, even for behavioral phenomena such as altruism, reciprocity, sociality, love, spiri-
tuality, and religiosity. (2018, pp. 143–144; emphases added)
For Cliquet and Avramov, (naturalistic) science and (supernaturalistic) religion are clearly at odds.
However, the opposition between religion and “secularism” is not as clear. On the one hand, they
describe secularization as “the societal transformation from a situation in which religious beliefs,
values, norms and institutions dominate within a context” to one “in which non-religious convic-
tions, values and norms, mainly based on autonomous human reason, prevail and secular insti-
tutions rule” (2018, p. 156). On the other hand, they call for a “move in which spiritual religion
and secular humanism could converge” (2018, p. 406), that is, for a convergent dialogue not only
among “secular ideologies,” such as those listed above, but also between the latter and “religious
ideologies.” They do not list the latter, but they do seem to privilege the major western monotheistic
religions; it is not clear how or whether the other fractured and fracturing supernatural belief systems
among the thousands of extant and emerging religious movements will get a place at the table.
This way of framing the issue leads them to propose a strategy that they summarize concisely in
the last discussion point offered in the target article.
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Discussion point 8: A scientific approach, especially an evolutionary approach, to ethical questions might
help to bring together religious and secular ideologies to design a new global ethic that not only deals with
the urgent challenges humankind is currently facing, but also focuses on a longer-term future. (Cliquet and
Avramov 2020, p. 18)
Keep in mind that this strategy is oriented toward a specific goal: designing a new, scientifically
grounded global ethic that funds the phylogenetic enhancement of hominization, the furtherance
of modernization, and ecological sustainability (2018, p. 396).
But, given their operationalization of “religion” as belief in and behavior guided by putative super-
natural agents and authorities, which is obviously opposed to the naturalistic explanations of evol-
utionary (and every other) science, why would they expect their dialogue with “secular” ideologies to
lead toward convergence? In their book they argue that “atheism,” which they describe as the absence
of theism or “a way of conceiving the world and desiring to change the world on the bases on auton-
omous reasoning, and making use of acquired scientific knowledge instead of relying on the authority
of supernatural agents,” actually “lies at the basis of many if not all of the secular ideologies” (2018,
pp. 158–159; emphases added). If so, then what kind of convergence could one expect from the dia-
logue they propose?
I want to be clear that I acknowledge the importance of highlighting the deep continuities that can
be traced across time and space in the projects of human civilization, including the continuities
between ancient and contemporary religions and the secularistic and naturalistic worldviews that
are replacing them in contexts where the population is existentially secure, well-educated, pluralistic,
and allowed freedom of expression (Shults, 2018b; Wildman et al. under review). I also want to be
clear that I am not downplaying the importance of open dialogue as a valuable and even necessary
component in the ongoing construction of a (pluralistic) global ethic. However, I am downplaying
the likelihood – no, given the authors’ use of terms, I am willing to deny the possibility – that reli-
gious ideologies could contribute qua “religious” ideologies to the sort of new global ethic that Cli-
quet and Avramov desire.
Of course, there are many non-religious elements entangled within religious ideologies and tra-
ditions that are not necessarily associated with or contingent upon supernatural beliefs and beha-
viors; for example, traditional wisdom about the structure and dynamics of the human search for
meaning, healthy ways of living together in community, practices for facilitating and managing
intense neurobiological experiences, and the value of feeling awe at the complexity of the universe.
But the point is that these are non-religious, that is, they are not unique to coalitions whose cohesion
depends on shared imaginative engagement with axiologically relevant supernatural agents. I agree
with Cliquet and Avramov that religion is maladaptive and that secular ideologies need a lot of work.
And I am all for dialogue. But, given the urgency of the challenges identified by the authors of the
target article, I believe that there are contexts in which we need to emphasize even more strongly the
way in the reciprocally reinforcing dynamics of naturalism and secularism are diametrically opposed
to religion (in the sense the term is being used here).
In other words, we need to straightforwardly have “the talk” about where gods come from and the
consequences of continuing to nurture them through in-group rituals that intensify out-group antag-
onism and superstitious thinking. The wealth of research reviewed and integrated in Evolution
Science and Ethics in the Third Millennium contributes to this task. I have proposed a slightly differ-
ent way of framing the conversation, one which I believe is consonant with the overall argument of
that book and perhaps even more conducive for achieving the overall goal it promotes. The general
claim of theogonic reproduction theory (TRT) is that “gods” (supernatural agent conceptions) are
born in human minds as a result of evolved content biases that activate inferences about hidden
human-like forms and borne in human cultures as a result of evolved context biases that activate pre-
ferences for distinctive in-group norms.
As indicated above, research also suggests that these theogonic (god-bearing) biases are recipro-
cally reinforcing, especially when people are confronted with ambiguous or frightening phenomena.
Reliance on supernatural concepts to explain confusing phenomena amplifies compliance with
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supernaturally authorized in-group norms and vice versa. Elsewhere I have summarized, analyzed
and evaluated much of the empirical evidence and scientific literature upon which this scholarly con-
sensus is based (Shults, 2014, 2015, 2018a, 2019; Shults, Gore, Lemos et al., 2018a).
This can be clarified in relation to the conceptual grid portrayed in Figure 1, which is intended as a
heuristic framework for discussing the cognitive and coalitional mechanisms that engender (or ener-
vate) beliefs and behaviors related to supernatural agents and authorities. Think of the horizontal
line as representing a continuum on which to indicate the extent to which a person tends to infer
that some natural phenomena (especially ambiguous or anxiogenic phenomena) are the result of
human-like supernatural forces (or “gods” in the general sense). And think of the vertical line as
representing a continuum on which to indicate the extent to which an individual tends to prefer
the supernaturally authorized norms of the religious coalition with which he or she primarily ident-
ifies as the basis for inscribing the social sphere.
Those who are anthropomorphically promiscuous and sociographically prudish (lower left quad-
rant of Figure 1) will somewhat automatically rely on appeals to supernatural causes when explaining
confusing events and comply with the supernatural conventions of their in-group when organizing
the social field. From the perspective of scientific disciplines such as cognitive science, evolutionary
psychology and cultural anthropology, “religion” can be understood as an emergent property (or set
of capacities and tendencies) of assemblages of these two types of evolved biases (which, of course,
must be further fractionated within the relevant disciplines). In other words, religiosity – as opera-
tionalized by many scientists within these fields, including Cliquet and Avramov – is the outcome of
the confluence of these reciprocally reinforcing content and context biases.
The integration of these religious biases may well have been adaptive in the early ancestral
environment, but we no longer live in the late Pleistocene. We live in the early Anthropocene
and, as Cliquet and Avramov point out, now face a vastly different set of ecological challenges.
Like racist, sexist, and classist biases, theist biases may have helped hold together increasingly com-
plex human societies over several millennia, but today the attitudes and actions they foster have
become maladaptive. Any successful strategy for adapting to our current, rapidly changing environ-
ment will need to include the widespread promotion of the capacity to contest such biases. In other
words, it will require energetic efforts that enhance and support the integration of the god-dissolving
(theolytic) mechanisms I call anthropomorphic prudery and sociographic promiscuity (upper right
quadrant of Figure 1).
Figure 1. The integration of theogonic mechanisms (lower left) and theolytic mechanisms (upper right).
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Anthropomorphically prudish individuals resist the temptation to grab at supernatural expla-
nations when confronted with ambiguous phenomena. Some are naturally predisposed toward
such incredulity while others are trained to think more naturalistically through formal scientific
and humanistic education. For a growing number of people, it is no longer necessary or helpful
to appeal to ghosts, goblins or God when trying to make sense of the world. Sociographically pro-
miscuous individuals are more open to social intercourse with members of out-groups about the
most adequate norms for structuring a pluralistic social field. Some have personality factors such
as openness (which is negatively correlated with religiosity) which incline them in this direction,
while for others learning how to moderate anxiety about cultural others is facilitated by the contex-
tual conditions of secularizing societies. For a growing number of people, it is no longer necessary or
helpful to appeal to putative divine revelations when trying to act sensibly in society.
The good news is that sociographic promiscuity and anthropomorphic prudery are also recipro-
cally intensifying. This is perhaps most obvious in contexts such as those found in Scandinavian
countries, among the least religious in the world, in which people
enjoy high levels of existential security, strong and stable governments with social safety nets, and they no
longer witness passionate displays of religiosity in the public sphere. These factors were likelymutually reinfor-
cing: increases in existential security reduced motivations to attend religious services, in turn causing further
declines of religious belief, leading to a cascade of irreligion. Furthermore, these societies have gradually and
successfully replaced religion with effective secular institutions that encourage cooperation and enjoy very
high levels of science education, which further encourages and reinforces analytic thinking that fosters religious
skepticism. (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013, p. 24; emphases added)
For additional evidence of the mutual intensification of naturalism and secularism, and other factors
that promote and enhance the interaction between variables related to anthropomorphic prudery
and sociographic promiscuity, see (Shults, 2018a).
Is atheism adaptive? Yes, if by adaptive we mean beneficial for the survival and enhancement of
the human species in the Anthropocene and if by atheism we mean the tendency to make sense of the
world and act sensibly within society without appealing to supernatural agents and authorities. The
promotion of atheist adaptive strategies is crucial for responding to the challenges identified by Cli-
quet and Avramov, and so we should be encouraged by the growing rate at which they are being
adopted across the globe (Gervais & Najle, 2018; Twenge et al., 2015; Voas & Chaves, 2016; Zucker-
man, 2007). Insofar as regularly encountering the idiosyncratic, non-falsifiable, empirically intract-
able, and prejudice promoting supernatural beliefs and behaviors of others can weaken the grip of
one’s own religious biases, dialogue certainly has played and will continue to play an important
role in this adaptive process. In my view, “prebunking” and other immunization strategies are
more likely to be successful than traditional “debunking” strategies which all too easily activate reli-
gious worldview defense mechanisms and can even make things worse (Shults, in press).
However, if the goal is contributing to our understanding of the complex adaptive social systems
in which we find ourselves and identifying the conditions under which – and the mechanisms by
which – we can find our way to a sustainable future, it is also important to take advantage of
other, more powerful analytic and forecasting tools at our disposal. For example, the causes and con-
sequences of the increase or decrease of religiosity within a population can be illuminated by agent-
based computational models, which are able to simulate the emergence of phenomena such as secu-
larization (Gore et al., 2018) and mutual escalating religious violence (Shults, Gore, Wildman, et al.,
2018b) within “artificial societies,” and trace the role played by particular micro-, meso-, and macro-
level variables in these socio-ecological systems.
Computational modeling can also contribute to the broader and bolder task which Cliquet and
Avramov encourage us to tackle: intentionally shaping the next major shift in the civilizational
form of human societies (Shults & Wildman, 2019). System-dynamics models with computational
architectures informed by empirical findings and theoretical developments across a variety of disci-
plines have been able to simulate the transitions from hunter-gathering to sedentary-agricultural
social forms (Shults & Wildman, 2018) and from early archaic states to the large-scale civilizations
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that emerged during the Axial Age in east, south and west Asia (Shults, Wildman, Lane, et al.,
2018b). Spoiler alert: although ideology did play a role in these shifts, it was by no means as dominant
a factor as many philosophers and theologians like to think. Simulation experiments on a compu-
tational model of the civilizational transformation in which we now find ourselves – from superna-
tural to naturalist worldviews – suggest that promoting existential security, pluralism, and freedom
of expression, as well as education, will be required for the successful completion of such a transition
(Wildman et al. under review).
I agree with Cliquet and Avramov that evolution science can play a key role in helping human-
kind face the societal challenges and ethical choices of the third millennium, and I applaud their will-
ingness to take on such a massive (and massively important) task. In this article, I have outlined
another way of operationalizing religion, naturalism, and secularism within a conceptual framework
that I believe complements their efforts by even more explicitly promoting an adaptive atheism.
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Needed: an ethics and ideology for spaceship Earth
Koen B. Tanghe
Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Universiteit Gent, Gent, Belgium
1. Introduction
Homo sapiens is the extra-somatic species, or the cultural species par excellence, as well as a highly
social species. Naturally, this is no coincidence: our remarkable success as a cultural species is highly
dependent on our ability to synchronically and diachronically interconnect with and learn from each
other (Henrich, 2016). Hence the huge importance of social practices, institutions, ideologies and
ethical rules. Now that humanity is increasingly acquiring the characteristics of a global village
and is also increasingly being confronted with the dire, global repercussions of the enormous exploi-
tative pressure it exerts on the Earth’s atmo-, hydro-, and biosphere, it is maybe more urgent than
ever to develop a well-thought-out ideological and ethical framework for that village. Evolution,
Science and Ethics in the Third Millennium (2018) addresses this huge challenge.
As a philosopher and historian of the life sciences, my modest contribution to this ambitious
and erudite endeavor is threefold. First of all, I will argue that Evolution, Science and Ethics in
the Third Millennium (2018) is a synthetic work of unique scope in that it elaborates a liberal-evol-
utionary humanism that encompasses a strong and evolutionarily-based social ethics (section 2).
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Secondly, I argue that the authors could have distinguished between a minimalist and a maximalist
evolutionarily-based approach to ethical and ideological questions. The minimalist approach uses
evolutionary theory as an epistemic tool for explaining and evaluating ethics and ideologies and for
identifying and discussing ethical and ideological challenges. The maximalist approach also con-
siders (human) evolution as an important ethical and ideological subject, including asking whether,
and to what extent, ethical rules can be derived from the facts of human evolution (section 3).
Thirdly, I will address the question how the global community might be convinced of adopting
an evolutionarily-based ethical and ideological framework or approach (section 4). This seems
to me to be highly dependent on the resolution of a more fundamental problem and anomaly.
2. A liberal-evolutionary and social humanism
In his otherwise largely laudatory review of Evolution, Science and Ethics in the Third Millennium
(2018), the Canadian ethicist Steven Umbrello (2019) highlights the “anthropocentric underpin-
nings” (192) of the book and claims that its policy recommendations “may ultimately do more
harm than good” (ibid.). It is “an affirmation of classical enlightenment thought of human superior-
ity, rationality, and global dominance” (193) that will “undoubtedly appeal to transhumanist and
related groups” (ibid.).
Cliquet and Avramov indeed embrace the “anthropocentric” humanist ideology as it “most clo-
sely approaches an evolutionarily-based ethics for the future development and evolution of man-
kind” (2018, p. 179). They define ethics as “The ensemble of values and norms in a culture”
(ibid., 18) but do not give a definition of the term “ideology”. It can be defined as “a system of col-
lectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular
pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of
conduct, which its proponents seek to promote, realise, pursue or maintain” (Hamilton, 1987, p.
38). The framework that the authors elaborate is ideological in this sense: they present a system
of normative and explanatory humanist ideas that advocates and/or justifies a particular pattern
of social conduct.
Put differently, they not only determine, from an evolutionary perspective, how we should
morally behave, but also what we should strive for. The distinction that they draw in the target article
between evolutionarily-based global goals (section 5) and evolutionarily-inspired moral guidelines
(section 6) is less explicit in Evolution, Science and Ethics in the Third Millennium (2018), but it
is nonetheless present. For instance, in chapter 5, they discuss a number of ethical “pursuits”.
Together, these evolutionarily-inspired guidelines and goals lay out an outspokenly humanist ethics
and ideology.
Harari (2015, p. 256) defines humanism as follows:
Humanism is a belief that Homo sapiens has a unique and sacred nature, which is fundamentally different from
the nature of all other animals and of all other phenomena. Humanists believe that the unique nature of Homo
sapiens is the most important thing in the world, and it determines the meaning of everything that happens in
the universe.
Used more generally, humanism refers to ideologies and movements that focus on the well-being
and progress of the human species, as opposed to the well-being of a particular religious or political
group or the axiological priority of nature over man, as in some environmentalist ideologies.
Harari (2015) distinguishes three rival “sects” in the humanist “religion”: liberal humanism,
socialist humanism and evolutionary humanism. Liberal humanism focuses on the freedom of
each individual, socialist humanism puts the collective first and values social equality above all,
whereas evolutionary humanism is preoccupied with the evolutionary enhancement of Homo
sapiens. The humanist project of Cliquet and Avramov can be characterized as liberal-evolutionary,
although it also promotes cooperation and equality of social opportunities and, like non-evolution-
ary humanist movements, emphasizes (1) the importance of the modernization process and the role
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of science therein and (2) the optimal ontogenetic development of human potentialities. Therefore, it
seems to be a well-thought-out synthesis of Harari’s three humanist strands. With that said, the
furtherance of the hominization process is clearly their central aim. They subscribe to the liberal
eugenics movement (Agar, 2004; Silver, 1998), which differs from the “old eugenics” in not elevating
“abstractions—the ‘race,’ the ‘population,’ and more recently the ‘gene pool’—above the rights and
needs of individuals and their families” (Kevles, 1985, p. 301).
3. The rationale for an evolutionary approach
In chapter 5, the authors enumerate a number of reasons why a global ethics should be evolutiona-
rily-based. In this respect, we can distinguish between the aforementioned minimalist and maximal-
ist approach.1
The rationale for the minimalist approach is very straightforward: evolutionary theories can in
various ways be helpful in the study of ideological and ethical questions. They can, for example,
be used to develop ultimate explanations of religions (i.e., theistic ideologies and ethics) or to analyze
and evaluate secular ideologies such as humanism, socialism, ecologism and liberalism (chapter 4).
They are also useful for identifying and discussing ethical challenges (chapters 6 and 7). They allow,
for example, “the identification of mismatches between our biological evolution and our cultural
development” (Cliquet & Avramov, 2018, p. 193) and “contribute to resolving conflicting ethical
choices” (ibid., 194).
The inclusion of (human) evolution in an ethical ideology (maximalist approach) may seem
bolder and more unconventional, but it is equally self-evident. As the authors point out: “The funda-
mental argument in favor of evolutionary ethics… is that life is an intergenerational phenomenon
and, even more important, an evolving phenomenon” (Cliquet & Avramov, 2018, p. 193). Man is
not only an evolved and evolvable being but also increasingly has the capacity to direct the evolution
of other living beings (e.g., the creation of synthetic life and de-extinction, the resurrection of extinct
species through cloning). An ambitious evolutionarily-based ethics and ideology cannot ignore this
important subject.
It must, in particular, formulate a moral vision on the trans- and possibly post-human future of
our species. Approximately ten thousand years ago, we abandoned our natural ecological niche. The
subsequent invention of modern science (Wootton, 2015) facilitated our release from the chains of
our natural “umwelt” or natural, religious and mystical interpretation of the world. Science and
(bio)technology now inevitably will lead us to a third “exit”: a liberation, through biological and tech-
nological enhancements, from the limitations and flaws of our natural body.
Lastly, there is also the question whether ethical rules can be derived from evolution or our evol-
vability. Evidently, the so-called naturalistic fallacy is, in an important way, correct: we should not
directly derive an “ought” from an evolutionary “is”. For example, the (probable) fact that the
human fist evolved as an adaptation for fist fighting (Horns et al., 2015) and that males evolved
beefy facial features as a defense against fistfights (Carrier &Morgan, 2015) does not morally warrant
resorting to fistfights to settle conflicts and disputes. In this sense, one might argue that the fact that
man is an evolvable product of evolution does not, in itself, mean that we ought to subject modern
populations to negative and/or positive eugenic practices. However, there is also an important way in
which the naturalistic fallacy is, itself, a fallacy (Wilson, 1998, p. 250) since any ethics and ideology is
and must be based on facts, including evolutionary facts. For example, euthanasia can be morally
legitimated by the physiological fact that human beings are susceptible to pain and by the medical
fact that pain cannot always be mitigated through medication.
In a similar vein, the fact that man evolves anywaymight, in itself, warrant steering that evolution in
the right direction (i.e., imposing a form of eugenics).2 Cliquet and Avramov (2018, p. 230) argue that a
further-evolved hominin than the presentHomo sapiensmight be “in a better position to cope with the
cosmic, biological and sociocultural challenges with which it will be confronted in the future” (discus-
sion point 6.1.3. of the target article). Undoubtedly, they mean to say that we need a smarter Homo
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sapiens. There is certainly something to be said for this argument. However, it should be reiterated that
our intelligence is largely collective (Henrich, 2016). Also, it is increasingly assisted by extra-somatic or
artificial forms of intelligence. Nonetheless, biological intelligence might, within certain strict limits, be
one of the criteria that parents are allowed to consider in their reproductive choices.
In any case, the danger “isn’t that the government will get involved in [those] reproductive
choices, but that it won’t” Wright (1990, p. 27). The third human exit seems to me to have become
as inevitable as the first and second became at a certain point in time. Consequently, the question
whether human evolvability can provide a moral basis for a modern form of eugenics is purely aca-
demic. The authors put it very well in the target article: whereas human reproduction in the twen-
tieth century was characterized by quantitative birth control, the twenty-first century will see a rapid
shift towards qualitative birth control and, thus, the genetic enhancement of the human species. I
agree with them that the ultimate decision should be left to individuals (discussion point 7.4.2.2.).
However, the government should set societal limits, not only to reproductive choices which could
harm the children’s well-being, but also to reproductive choices which could hurt the human
gene pool. In particular, we should be aware of the danger that unequal access to reprogenetic tech-
niques could produce a two-tiered society of “GenRich” and “GenPoor” people, and that the human
species could evolve into two separate species or even into “a whole Galapagos of different human
species” (Weiner, 1999, p. 244).
4. The challenge: from castle in the air to reality
How can the ideologically and ethically divided company of what might be called spaceship Earth
(Tanghe, 2014) be convinced to accept and adopt an evolutionarily-inspired approach to ethical
and ideological questions or the kind of ambitious, evolutionarily-based ethical and ideological fra-
mework that Cliquet and Avramov elaborate? Without a convincing answer to that question, their
impressive intellectual effort is in danger of remaining not much more than a castle in the air. The
rationale that they develop in chapter 5 seems to contain an element of circularity (which also
seems to be the case with the first discussion point of the target article) in that only scholars
and people who are already convinced of the importance of an evolutionary approach to the
study of man will accept it.
In any case, the current absence of a common evolutionary ethics and ideology seems to me to be
merely a symptom of a deeper problem or anomaly: the non-existence of an integrated, evolutionary
and historical science of man that provides a common framework for the modern multitude of
humanities and social sciences. Currently, evolutionary ethics is merely a branch of the science of
ethics, in the same way that evolutionary economics is a school of economics and evolutionary psy-
chology a school of psychology. In 2001, the evolutionary psychologist Leda Cosmides predicted that
evolutionary biology would become a standard part of graduate training in psychology, just as every
biologist needs to know chemistry and physics. It will then be silly to talk about evolutionary psy-
chology: “It will just be psychology. But it will no longer be isolated from the rest of humanity’s
knowledge. Psychology will, at that point, be an integrated discipline: one that has confidently
taken its place among the many valuable fields of knowledge, doing its part to create the bridges
that enrich each field and us all” (Cosmides, 2001). A similar argument can be made for evolutionary
ethics and economics.
Tooby and Cosmides distinguish two kinds of evolutionary psychology: “Evolutionary psychol-
ogy in the narrow sense is the scientific project of mapping our evolved psychological mechanisms;
in the broad sense, it includes the project of reformulating and expanding the social sciences (and
medical sciences) in light of the progressive mapping of our species’ evolved architecture” (2005,
p. 6). That broad kind of evolutionary psychology “is the long-forestalled scientific attempt to assem-
ble out of the disjointed, fragmentary, and mutually contradictory human disciplines a single, logi-
cally integrated research framework for the psychological, social, and behavioral sciences” (ibid., 5).
Elsewhere (Tanghe, 2019), I have made the comparison with the history of geology and biology. Both
RELIGION, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR 37
sciences followed a similar historical development. First, there existed a multitude of fields and
sciences that studied aspects of, respectively, Earth and life. At a certain point in time, the concept
of an integrated science of Earth and life emerged. Subsequently, this project was largely realized
through the discovery and study of the deep history of Earth and life (i.e., evolution). This deep his-
tory functioned as a kind of glue that bound together the various Earth and life sciences (see, for the
Earth sciences, Rudwick, 2005, and for the life sciences, Smocovitis, 1996).
The unresolved question is why the same integration process has not yet forged the sciences and
academic disciplines that study our species into one evolutionary and historical science of man, even
though both the concept of an integrated science of man and the deep biological and cultural history
of our species are well known. I believe this is a major but unrecognized historiographical conun-
drum, the solution of which would, ipso facto, be key to constructing that elusive integrated, histori-
cal-evolutionary science of man and thus also to convincing people of the utility and even necessity
of an evolutionary approach to ethical and ideological questions and of accepting a common, evol-
utionary ethics and ideology.
5. Conclusion
Evolution, Science and Ethics in the Third Millennium (2018) offers much food for thought for a wide
array of scholars and scientists. As a philosopher and historian of the life sciences, I have focused on
three aspects of Cliquet’s and Avramov’s approach and framework. It elaborates a liberal-evolution-
ary humanism that encompasses an evolutionarily-based social ethics that is centered on one particu-
lar goal: the furtherance of the hominization process (i.e., evolutionary humanism). Secondly, we can
distinguish between a minimalist and a maximalist evolutionarily-based approach to ethical and
ideological questions. Lastly, it was argued that key to forcing a breakthrough for such an approach,
or to providing the global village with a common evolutionary ethics and ideology, will be the realiz-
ation of the long-standing dream of an evolutionary-historical science of man that unifies and inte-
grates the absurdly fragmented multitude of academic disciplines that currently study our species. As
long as the latter goal is not achieved, the realization of the former goal will remain a distant dream.
Notes
1. Traditionally, three branches are distinguished in evolutionary ethics. Descriptive evolutionary ethics consists
of evolutionary explanations of human morality, for example an evolutionary explanation of our sense of fair-
ness. Prescriptive evolutionary ethics appeals to evolutionary theory in justifying or debunking ethical theories
or claims. A third major branch of evolutionary ethics, evolutionary metaethics, uses evolutionary theories to
debunk or support metaethical theories, e.g., the possibility of objective moral knowledge.
2. Cochran and Harpending (2009, p. 1) even argue that the evolution of our species “is now happening 100 times
faster than its long-term average over the 6 million years of our existence.”
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Comment on evolution science and Ethics in the Third Millennium
Kris Thienpont
Artevelde University of Applied Sciences, Ghent, Belgium
We have here an impressive and thought-provoking work on the future of human morality. The
book—summarized all too briefly in the target article—is an intellectual treatise on the application
of evolutionary theory to the morals of our day. One of the major contributions of this book is its
exceptional capacity to transcend disciplinary boundaries between fields that are by nature quite
differentiated and separated from one another. Each of the topics dealt with takes into account bio-
logical evolutionary processes in a longer-term perspective, socio-cultural changes, and ecological
constraints. Books pushing interdisciplinarity to the limit as this one does are exceptional.
Writing an interdisciplinary work requires both in-depth knowledge of the areas covered as well
as a special talent, eye, and hand for synthesis and overview. Both requirements are elegantly met in
this work, and so we have here an encyclopedic work that fits in the intellectual tradition of the big
science writers of this day, such as Stephen Pinker, Edward Wilson, Richard Dawkins, etc.
So I appreciate this work very much as a challenge to consider the evolutionary past of human
sociality and to reconsider the evolutionary future in specific directions. These directions the authors’
attempt to determine, not on the basis of some ideological framework, but on rigorous analysis of the
evolutionary forces at work in past, present and future contexts (although some will suggest that the
choice for the evolutionary sciences as analytical framework and guideline for directional options in
our morality is in ideological point of departure in itself). The book is not easy to read and contains so
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much material that readers who really want to get a grip on the argument may well find themselves
returning to chapters and pages many times. Rightly so, as this book deserves to be read thoroughly
and critically, since it offers insights into our evolutionary past, our contemporary society, moral sys-
tems and their dynamics and history, and the challenges for the future of our species.
Overall, I concur with the authors’ argument. Traditional religions may well seem extremely
meaningful when considering large-scale conflicts of our day, but, from the perspective of the adap-
tationist logic underlying evolutionary biology, religions lost their authority and became maladap-
tive. The adaptive nature of religions hinged on the state of premodern societies. With the
development and application of modern scientific knowledge a much more powerful, evidence-
based “belief system” came into place. I also support the reasoning that only an evolutionary logic
enables an encompassing screening and selection of long-term moral and ethical directions. And
the authors do make choices. The most fundamental one, underlying the argumentation throughout
the book, is that the perpetuation of the hominization process, with the continuation of the modern-
ization process and the achievement of a sustainable ecology as preliminary conditions, is the prin-
cipal goal to pursue. From there on, several ambitions are implied: optimal ontogenetic development,
the promotion of quality of life, the promotion of equity, the shift from predominantly competitive
towards cooperative social relations, and the promotion of universalism.
The first issue that needs to be raised is the relation between environment and evolutionary
processes. In the early stages of our evolution (hominization, in the words of Robert Cliquet
and Dragana Avramov) we struggled to deal with the challenges our environment imposed on
us. The environment was something we constantly had to deal with. Environment has to be
seen here in its widest possible meaning: physical environment, predators, social environment,
and so on. The crucial turn that the agricultural stage made possible was that humans first started
to use the environment to their own benefit and, for example, a sedentary life became possible.
Ever since, the impact of humans on the environment has increased, up to the current state of
a dramatic climate impact. So, environments of adaptation change, partly because of what humans
choose to do or not to do. The mismatch principle put forward in the book is common knowledge:
due to the increasing difference in speed of biological versus cultural evolution since approximately
50,000 years ago, our brain structure remains adapted to the so-called “environment of evolution-
ary adaptedness” or to Pleistocene conditions. But still, when considering the long-term evolution
of our society and the morals that will structure our way of living in that future social environ-
ment, the question arises as to what extent our still increasing scientific and technological
capacities will enable us to overcome the disadvantages of living with a nonadapted brain. It is
evident that this century will be the time when some technological evolutions take drastic turns
or reach for the first time in their development an adequate level of application. For example, tech-
nologies that enable individuals to choose genetically shaped characteristics in their children will
become widespread and socially integrated. Even though the dark shadow of the horrible practices
pursued in previous centuries in the name of eugenics clouds every contemporary discussion on
the use of reproductive technology, it is clear that reproductive technology will become standard
practice in human reproduction sometime this century. Cliquet and Avramov acknowledge this in
discussion point 7.4.3. “The twenty-first century might see the rapid shift from chance to choice in
matters of qualitative birth control and genetic enhancement of the human species” (p. 13). Ana-
logously, future generations will have to face the dire consequences of climate change. And the
demographic projections we can now make show drastic shifts in the population distribution all
over the world and therefore of the geopolitical relations in the world. And so we can make all
sorts of projections of what the future society will look like. But what does all this mean for
our nonadapted brain? If the mismatch increases, it will only intensify the influence on human
behavior of the innate universal characteristics the authors are justifiably so concerned about.
On the other hand, the technological evolution itself may provide us with the tools to overcome
the mismatch. It is not completely clear to me to what extent the moral choices the authors pro-
pose in their book are aimed at constructing that future environment or rather function as the
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behavioral standards for enabling us to deal with that future environment. In other words, our
moral choices for the future will always have to be made within a particular context, or, with a
particular context in mind. It is therefore required that we also project a vision of what the
environment of the future will look like.
My second fundamental point deals with the “how”-question. Repeatedly, the authors refer to our
“innate drives” as causes of actions with detrimental effects. Consider for example discussion point
6.1.1., which deals with ecological sustainability: “This destruction results from a number of human
innate drives such as resource and territory possession…” (p. 4). This point is correct; it is essential
to the mismatch between biological and cultural evolution and the brain structure that follows from
it. So this begs the question how, if indeed it seems that these innate drives with such dramatic impact
are so powerful, will we ever overcome these in our search and mission for a sustainable society?
Part of the explanation for the power of these drives is that they construct a basic behavioral pro-
gram that is in essence neutral in its effects. It is the same unique capacity for social behavior, for
working together in small and large groups, whether it is employed to invent systems and mechan-
isms to prevent overpopulation and to set up large-scale beneficiary actions for disadvantaged
peoples, or to go to war, to seek alliances with some against others, and to conduct some of the
worst atrocities. There is no innate good or bad nature in humans; there is an evolved capacity to
behave in social situations in such a way that we win some and avoid losing too much. So even
though I completely agree with the moral choices and directions the authors recommend, I do
think we’ll need more than the often suggested proximal approaches to achieve them. Just because
an aspect of the human condition is maladaptive does not make it easy to change.
For example, I strongly concur with the proposition raised in discussion point 7.2.4: “In the culture
of the future, the moral goal should be focused on supporting the drive for individual self-actualization
and inter-individual co-operation instead of inter-individual competition.” That is indeed the desirable
future prospect. Assuming we all agree on that one, what is the strategy that we will develop to achieve
this aim? Competition is essential to human social life. How are we going to assure that the variety of
proximal mechanisms we use to nudge behavior will be strong enough to counteract these powerful
innate drives? While reading the target article I was sometimes under the impression that the authors
assume this will be the case. I’m not so sure and it seems to me a crucial point. Precisely because of the
mismatch between current environment and evolved brain, the innate drives that guide our behavior
are powerful and difficult to overcome. The mismatch is still growing. We’ll need an equally powerful
strategy to guide our behavior in the direction of the moral choices we think have to be made.
In discussion point 7.4.2.2., the authors outline four aspects of the most optimal perspective on
reproductive goals. The first three are all at the individual level and probably not an issue to most
people. The fourth aspect, however, addresses the societal level and suggests that society set limits
to genetic choices which could harm the children’s wellbeing. I applaud the careful treatment of
such a sensitive subject, but we need to acknowledge the urgency of the questions raised here. Cliquet
and Avramov nicely illustrate what a subtle and scientifically-based approach to eugenic reproduc-
tion looks like. In the wake of the breakthrough of reproductive technology in the course of this cen-
tury, we cannot emphasize enough the urgency of a social debate on the place of these technologies in
our future society. We should embrace the approach recommended in this book.
My final remark is about the issue raised in 6.3.1. At first, this may read as a justification of the
structural social inequality as we know it. In reality, this paragraph takes a stand on the sociological
discussion on “equality of opportunity” versus “equality of outcome” that follows directly from the
question raised in 5.2.3. A social hierarchy is an unavoidable aspect of human organization, but if it is
based on the principles outlined in 5.2.1. (ontogenetic development at the highest possible level) and
5.2.3. (equality of opportunities) there is no inherent social disadvantage. I am glad this issue is a
substantial part of the moral framework proposed here because this is becoming one of the major
themes in modern societies and will likely continue to be important as our knowledge about behavior
genetics and the genetic basis of human capacities develops further. However, one particular concern
needs to be mentioned: we have to avoid replacing social inequality with individual inequality. For
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example, in discussion point 7.1., in the context of individual development, the authors speak of
“phenotypically privileged persons.” Those who read the whole story understand what they mean,
and to me, a sociologist, it reads as an opportunity: from this perspective, individuals from a
lower SES background who often struggle to develop their characteristics because of social, econ-
omic, or cultural disadvantages, will have equal opportunity for development because the focus is
on individual phenotypic growth. The concern might be, however, on the societal translation of
this point. How will we define “persons with high potential” and how will society ensure maximum
growth opportunities for everyone?
These are just a few of the many questions and issues raised by reading this impressive work. I can
only hope that this book will inspire academics and social and political leaders to discuss the future
and, hopefully, share the authors’ same sense of urgency.
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RESPONSE
Reflections on the strengths and shortcomings of our book
Robert Cliqueta and Dragana Avramovb
aDepartment of Population Studies, Ghent University, Brussel, Belgium; bPopulation and Social Policy Consultants
(PSPC), Brussel, Belgium
We thank RBB for the privilege of discussing our book and target article with five highly knowledge-
able colleagues from different scientific disciplines related to ethics and evolution science.
Their deliberations are highly inspiring for re-examining our own standpoints and further reflect-
ing on our thesis that evolution science can be a useful instrument for considering possible and desir-
able directions in which morality in the globalized world could and should evolve. We are very happy
about the discussants’ praise for our book as a whole and we very much appreciate their interesting,
well-argued, and pertinent critical comments. Identification of possible biases and shortcomings is
invaluable, especially now when we are working on a popularizing version based on the present
Springer volume.
Overall, the discussants endorsed the most crucial issues dealt with in our book, in particular the
importance of an evolutionary approach for understanding the past and shaping future pursuits of
unifying morality. Our aim was to revitalize an old idea and to add some more arguments in the light
of the recent developments in evolution-relevant sciences and the current and future challenges
humanity is or will be facing.
Regarding the evolutionary approach, all discussants appear to share our view as far as concerns
its relevance for the scientific understanding of the origin and significance of morality for under-
standing the history of human evolution. Some of the discussants, however, are not convinced
about our claim and argumentation that the acquired knowledge of evolution science about the
hominization process can serve as a guide for the continuation of this process in the future.
The book chapters in which we applied our approach to the major biosocial challenges humanity
is struggling with were less subject to discussion, except some topics, such as eugenics and euthana-
sia, which appear to some of the discussants to be among the more daring propositions in our book.
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The reader should be aware that our approach includes many more challenging theses, such as, for
instance, the need at the interpersonal level for revitalizing basic moral virtues, the need for moving
from competitive to cooperative efforts, the need for shifting from in-group to global concerns, the
need for a world population decline, the need for a more efficient and fair global governance, etc., all
of which might be considered very provocative in several quarters.
Each one of the very valuable contributions of the discussants incites us to some specific response
or some complementary comments.
Response to Jordan Kiper: toward an evolutionary science based metaethics
Throughout his commentary, Jordan Kiper praises the holistic approach, the diverse contents, and
the depth and extensiveness of the argumentation developed in our book. He appreciates our broad
evolutionary perspective that generates insights on the origin and evolution of morality, but disputes
whether this insight can support deontic statements about ethical human conduct.
One of the discussant’s major criticisms concerns the Is/Ought Problem. In our book we argue
that the question about the transition from Is (fact) to Ought (value) is seemingly logical but is a
flawed question. The reason is that human life is not a static phenomenon, but a very vulnerable
homeostatic system, ontogenetically and phylogenetically at the risk of permanent change, or
even degeneration. Human life functions, at the individual, interpersonal or intergenerational
level, are not completely genetically programed and require deontic interventions of ethics to achieve
sociobiological functionality. Evolution science shows us that the sociobiological specificity of the
human species consists in the fact that its intragenerational (life course or ontogenetic) development,
its social relations, and its intergenerational (phylogenetic) development include a moral dimension.
Hence, human specificity is not a purely biological phenomenon, but a bio-social, bio-cultural, or
even bio-ethic phenomenon. In our book we didn’t use this last term, although the idea behind it
was extensively elaborated. Morality is built into our biology through innate moral sentiments,
although it needs to be complemented by moral reasoning. Without ethics, there would be no
human. Hence, the pertinent question for us is which ethical choices can be made. This question
is not fundamentally different from the question which biological features (genes, organs, organ sys-
tems, behavior) to select, intragenerationally and intergenerationally. The fact that human biological
specificity is an integrated bio-ethic phenomenon and (human) life is an evolutionary phenomenon
needs, in our view, no sturdier argument for breaching the Is/Ought barrier. We acknowledge that it
might have been necessary to elaborate our reasoning in greater detail (Richards, 2020).
In our book we used an additional, albeit topical argument for considering a broad, long-term
evolutionary perspective for contemplating our future. Modernity is a disruptive cultural innovation
to which our bio-ethical constitution is not well adapted. Ethical choices have to be made on the basis
of the joint consideration of the hominization process and the modernization process. The ethical
choice we proposed in our book, on the basis of our evolutionary perspective, is to favor progression,
instead of extinction, regression, or stabilization. We advanced many arguments in favor of this
choice, arguments which are not only based on innate (and culturally reinforced) individual drives
for improvement of living conditions, but which are also supported by the trends in the evolutionary
and historical past of the hominin tribe.
Kiper mentions several topics dealt with in our book which he considers controversial. He does
express appreciation for our daringness and interest in controversial topics that might stimulate
research on questions at the intersection of evolution science and ethics. We will focus on one con-
troversy addressed by Kiper which we consider of crucial importance: eugenics. Kiper sees no con-
vincing argument for deriving eugenics from evolution science. Yet, the eugenic propositions in our
book belong probably to the most relevant examples of evolutionarily founded moral guidelines. In
prescientific living conditions natural selection, through differential mortality, generated “eugenic”
effects in reproductive outcomes, whilst in modernity mortality was replaced as a selection mechan-
ism by qualitative fertility control. Moreover, if we strive to enhance humanity’s innate capabilities,
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in whatever domain—cognition, emotion, health, sociability—there are two ways: phenotypic
enhancement during ontogeny, or genetic enhancement via differential reproduction or germinal
manipulation. An evolutionary perspective leads, either on the basis of the rational choice or the
emotional drive for enhancement, to euphenics and eugenics.
Kiper raises several questions about how a prescriptive evolutionary ethics may be influenced by
preconceived ideological convictions. He argues that some components of a desirable universal ethic
may be founded on another basis than an evolutionary based morality and also doubts whether an
evolutionarily ethical approach can serve as a binding and uniting factor against the existing ideo-
logical divides in the world.
We are fully aware of the risk that scientific approaches to moral issues might be influenced by
ideological preconceptions. We consciously endeavored to avoid ideological interference and limit
ourselves to derive ethical goals and guidelines on the basis of a holistic evolutionary approach. How-
ever, the attentive reader will, obviously, discover many points where our ethical derivations largely
or partly coincide with well-known positions taken in particular ideologies. Many ideas in religious
as well as secular ideologies are based on emotional or rational considerations that result from
empirical observations or experiences many of which have been subject to Darwinian selection.
Kiper’s statement that moral innovations, such as human rights, are derived from reflection and
moral reasoning is absolutely correct, but not in contradiction with an evolutionary approach. All
values and norms in an evolutionary ethical system can be the result of reflection and moral
reasoning or can also be supported by our innate moral sentiments. Recent moral innovations
such as universal human rights, derived from the principle of human dignity can, as adaptations
to the modernization process, also justified from an evolutionary perspective which involves the
pursuance of high standards in individual ontogenetic development. However, the human rights
approach, as defined and enshrined in important international charters, is from the evolutionary
perspective a necessary but incomplete moral rule. From an evolutionary perspective, human rights
should always be complemented by and linked to human responsibilities, a moral rule which is
often neglected in international standard setting charters and rights-based debates.
Regarding the Kiper’s doubts about the uniting capacity of an evolutionary perspective vis-à-vis
the ideological diversity and controversy in the world, we have ourselves expressed serious reser-
vations. But there are also hopeful signs: in modernity, one can discern a clear shift from ideological
towards scientific approaches in ethical thinking and policy making; and in many countries one can
also observe increasing efforts of scientifically based ideological congruency. However, acknowled-
ging that traditional religious and modern secular ideologies will likely be with us for quite some
time, we argued that there is an urgent need in a progressing modernizing world to acknowledge
an emerging universal world community, which goes a step further than universal right aspirations
and standard setting. This proposition goes against our innate inclination toward small groups, but
the idea of founding an evolutionarily based universal morality is precisely to adapt the human
species to its new cultural and ecological environment. We acknowledge that massive appropriation
of the global unifying ethics that transcends dated notions of national sovereignty and religious in-
group flocking is a challenge to present models of governance and current world order, and therefore
may not come easily.
Kiper concludes his commentary by defending our main argument as a metaethics for informing
how we think about morality, values, and ethics in the twenty-first century. We consider this as a
positive appreciation for our work. It might be an incentive for a further deepening of an attempt
to approach human challenges from a broader temporal perspective and in a holistic framework.
Response to Michael E. Price: a moral obligation to promote future human
evolution?
Michael E. Price agrees with us about an important aspect of the relationship between evolution
science and morality: he considers evolutionary science as relevant to ethics, not only because of
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learning about the origin and evolution of morality in past environments, but also for improving the
future for ourselves and generations to come. This is an extremely important element in the scientific
and ideological discussions and controversies about the relevance of taking into consideration
knowledge about our evolutionary past for reflecting on our evolutionary future.
Price also tends to share our moral vision, notwithstanding his doubts about whether this can be
mandated, validated, or endorsed by evolutionary science. In particular, Price considers the further-
ance of the hominization process—the basic proposition in our book—as a subjectively preferable
goal. We are fully aware that this choice is for us, as authors, also a subjectively preferable goal,
based on our own innate drive or learned aspiration for achievement and enhancement. However,
in our book we tried to avoid involving our personal preferences, but endeavored to advance rational,
scientifically-informed arguments in favor of this choice. This brings us to Price’s major objection to
our approach.
Price does not see how the evolutionary process could in general be goal-directed in any teleologi-
cal or teleonomic sense, unless biocultural evolution were the product of some “meta-natural-selec-
tion” process. We fear that, here, there is fundamental misunderstanding. First, we want to make it
very clear that, in no section of our book, did we intend to suggest that the evolutionary process is a
goal-directed phenomenon. We explicitly stated on page 228 that “The hominization process is a
teleonomic process characterized by directionality in its evolution, albeit not a teleologic process
resulting from a preplanned intelligent design,” and we added in footnotes the definition of teleon-
omy and teleology. Perhaps the concept teleonomy is understood in different ways in the literature,
but from the definition we reproduced in the footnote, it is clear that the evolutionary process might
give the impression (“apparent purposefulness”) of being goal-directed, but it is not. Our first and
second chapters in the book, which summarize the hominization process and explain the evolution-
ary mechanism, nowhere state or suggest that evolution is a goal-directed process. Perhaps future
discoveries and theories, involving a kind of “meta-natural-selection” process will lead to that con-
clusion, but present-day scientific observations and theory cannot yet support the goal-directedness
of the evolutionary process or its mechanism.
We argued that knowledge about the hominin evolutionary process and the evolutionary mech-
anism can, taking into account the modernization process and the planetary ecological context, be a
framework for helping humanity to choose the future direction of its biological evolution and cul-
tural development. Our choice of progressing hominization instead of possible alternative scenarios
(extinction, regression, or stabilization) is based on (1) the rational examination of past human bio-
ethical evolution, (2) the outcome of that past evolution, namely our bio-ethical nature (see our com-
ments on Jordan Kiper’s discussion), including our innate drive for survival, exploration, improve-
ment, and intergenerational continuity, and (3) an evaluation of the possible outcomes of the four
alternative scenarios considered regarding humanity’s success in matters of survival, life satisfaction,
improvement of living conditions, etc.
It is not evolution science per se that dictates how we should behave morally, but rather human
beings, with their bio-ethical needs and potentialities, who might, taking into account their long-
term past evolutionary process and its mechanism, in combination with the opportunities of the
modernization process and the limitations of the planet’s ecological context, decide which future
long-term direction their biological evolution, morality, and culture should take. Our rational evalu-
ation of the possible choices before us leads us to conclude that a further progressing hominization
and modernization, in the context of a sustainable ecology, might be the most optimal choice, better
than any of the other three scenarios envisaged.
In proposing that choice, we tried to rely only on facts—the whole of the facts that are relevant to
our future, including our evolutionary past, our present biological potentialities (strengths and weak-
nesses), our present cultural stage (modernity), the planet’s ecology, and above all the fact that
(human) life is an evolving long-term transgenerational phenomenon that cannot be limited to its
individual level of organization or to its community level of organization. Rather, an evolutionary
approach needs to consider humanity as a whole, the entire human species.
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Response to F. LeRon Shults: evolutionary ethics and adaptive atheism
F. LeRon Shults concentrates his comments on some of the touchiest issues in our book that are
related to religion, secularism, and atheism. In general, Shults agrees with the way we described
and evaluated the transition from supernaturalistic to naturalistic ideology and, in particular, our
treatment and conclusions about the maladaptation of religious ideologies in modernity and the
need to move to a naturalistic approach.
Shults’s contribution reinforces our argumentation for a transition from a religious to a scientific
approach aimed at the conceptualization of a new global morality. He also expresses appreciation for
the courageous way in which we dealt with a host of sensitive issues and offered constructive pro-
posals, in particular regarding the direction in which a future global morality should be developed.
Our approach to this issue challenged some well-established and politically correct viewpoints and
addressed existing fears about genetic and social engineering, scientism, and elitism.
Regarding our argument about the maladaptivity of religion in modernity, Shults observes that we
omitted to include in our analysis the striking but touchy issue of the negative correlation between
religion and intelligence. We are well aware of the relevant literature on this phenomenon. One of us
even did some empirical research on this topic (Cliquet and Balcaen, 1983a, 1983b; see also Cliquet,
2010). Hence, we should perhaps have included this topic in our list of arguments for the maladapta-
tion thesis. However, we have no knowledge about multivariate analyses in which the religious factor
is isolated from other covariant social determinants of the intelligence-religion correlation, such as
education, social status, ethnicity, access to scientific knowledge, and general cultural background.
All of these variables have been shown to be related to measures of cognition as well as to religiosity
or religious practice (e.g., Jackson, et al., 2007; Kaasa, 2013; Lehrer, 1999; Sander, 1992; Sherkat,
2011).
Regarding the chapters in our book where we deal with secular ideologies, Shults perceives some
unclarity in our use of the term secular, especially in its relation and opposition to the term reli-
gious. Further, he notes the lack of a definition of the concept naturalism. With respect to the use
of the terms secular, secularism, and secularization, we agree that the English terminology might
sound somewhat confusing, but we used these terms as they are defined and distinguished in
the professional literature and we tried to clarify them on pages 156–158 in our book. Regarding
the concept of naturalism, we indeed omitted to define this term, and this might be confusing,
especially for lay readers. We used the term naturalism as it is defined in the Oxford dictionary
as the idea that “everything arises from natural properties and causes, and supernatural or spiritual
explanations are excluded or discounted.” The concept might be confusing because in the bio-
anthropological literature the word “nature” is often used in opposition to the concept “nurture”
or “culture.” Shults is correct in his understanding of our use of the word “naturalism” that it refers
to non-supernatural explanations. In our sense “naturalism” includes natural as well as cultural
phenomena.
The most important and relevant comments in Shults’s contribution concern two crucial and
interrelated questions, namely (1) the feasibility of uniting religious and secular ideologies to
work together in developing a universal ethic, and (2) the possibility of creating a universal ethic
at all.
Regarding our plea, in the last chapter of our book, for intensifying the dialogue between religious
and atheist progressives in view of promoting a new universal ethic within the framework of an over-
all and long-term evolutionary ethical approach, Shults favors an alternative strategy. He advocates
reinforcing naturalism and secularism for a further completion of the civilizational transformation
from supernatural to naturalist worldviews. This is a very pertinent suggestion.
We are aware that scientists should make much more efforts in education, agogics, policy advising
and communication informing the general public, ethical thinktanks, and policy making bodies
about the moral and policy implications of modern scientific findings and achievements. Critical
thinking is not yet taught in schools adequately to match the digital transformation, outreach by
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scientists to the general public is insufficient, and bits and pieces of scientific knowledge are often
taken up à la carte by policy makers. Such an ecosystem is not fit to counter obsolete worldviews
that, as holdovers from earlier cultural and ecological stages in human history, still confuse the
minds of people, divide communities, and hamper cooperative international relations. Like the sex-
ist, classist, and racist biases from earlier times, theist biases should be debunked and even pre-
bunked, as Shults suggests. The necessity of this strategy is also supported by knowledge we have
about the genetic and neurological factors involved in spirituality and religiosity, on which we
included a relatively long and important section in our book, but which was not mentioned by
any of the discussants. The genetic and neurological determinants of spirituality and religiosity
show that there are strong biological background factors for the sensitivity, receptivity, and
emotional gratification of religious behavior. Very probably in our evolutionary past these behaviors
were under positive selective pressures because of their earlier adaptive effects in our Environment of
Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA). Hence, scientists will not only have to counter the teachings of the
religious institutions, but also have to take into account the human innate sensitivity and receptivity
for ideas and ideals about supernatural phenomena and agencies. Could human aspirations replace
supernatural beliefs?
Whereas Shults’s’s alternative strategy is undoubtedly highly necessary, it should not exclude the
dialoguing strategy we advocated in our book. Obviously, we share Shults’s doubts about whether it
is possible to unite religious and secular ideologies, let alone theist and atheist worldviews, around an
evolutionarily inspired, global ethic. The philosophical and methodological foundations of religious
and scientific approaches are, indeed, fundamentally different and irreconcilable. That is the reason
why we advocated a less ambitious approach that mobilizes religious and secular people who share a
“progressive” attitude, i.e., are prepared or tend to approach human challenges and crises taking into
account the knowledge we have or can acquire about those challenges and crises and the broader
cultural and ecological context in which they occur.
We do believe that there are no fundamental reasons why religious as well as secular ideologies
could not find in their theological and philosophical foundations the necessary arguments to share or
adopt a more long-term, evolutionarily inspired, ethical approach to secure humanity’s future. Prob-
ably, the reasons for religious-secular (theist-atheist) discordances reside more in humans innate
drives and in institutions that humans create for competition and power procurement.
A minor point related to the question of religious-secular dialogue concerns Shults’s observation
that our discussion of religious ideologies is limited to the monotheistic Mediterranean religions.
This is a pertinent comment and a shortcoming from our side. Meanwhile, we published a Dutch
language synthesis of the Springer volume (Cliquet and Avramov, 2019), addressed to a broader,
non-expert readership, in which we included in the chapter on religious ideologies a selection of
East-Asian religions and philosophical traditions that addressed one polytheistic religion (Hindu-
ism) and two non-theistic philosophical traditions, namely, Buddhism and Confucianism, and eval-
uated them from an evolutionary perspective. It came as no surprise that this extension to other
religions that originated in the agrarian era did not change substantially our major conclusions on
the adaptive value of those ideologies in prescientific times and our evolutionarily based evaluation
of those worldviews for modernity.
Shults’s second fundamental comment regarding the possibility of creating a universal ethic is a
very substantial question. It aligns with fundamental doubts about the possibility or probability of
achieving a culturally unified human civilization and reminds us of Raymond Cattell’s (1972) idea
of the continuation or establishment in modernity of culturally diverse civilizations as well as Samuel
P. Huntington’s (1996) “Clash of Civilizations.”
Very probably, we will for quite some time be confronted with the existence of a culturally diverse
world—for instance, in simplified terms a more individualistically oriented West, a more commu-
nity-focused East, a predominantly religiously dominated Arab world—in which several divisive
power structures and cultural factors, and not just religion, are involved. Nevertheless, Shults is
absolutely right that religion is one of the major divisive factors on the world scene. As scientific
RELIGION, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR 47
advisors to our respective governmental delegations at the United Nations World Population Con-
ferences of Bucharest 1974, Mexico City 1984, and Cairo 1994 (Avramov and Cliquet, 2016), we have
observed that religiously dominated governments were one of the most disruptive factors inhibiting a
global consensus. Scientific advisors (to mostly European countries) had a hard time avoiding the
weakening of sensitive topics in the final conference documents due to the notorious reservation
“respecting cultural and religious values” (Cliquet and Thienpont, 1995; United Nations, 1994).
As we wrote already in our response to Jordan Kiper, there are also positive and hopeful signs,
although it might take still quite some time before they fully mature or materialize. From the scien-
tific and policy literature as well as from our experience during our policy-advising tasks in govern-
mental and intergovernmental institutions, we perceive a gradual shift in policy making from
predominantly ideological to more knowledge based, scientifically informed choices of actions
and pathways. As the modernization process progresses and spreads all over the world, scientific
knowledge gets disseminated through an increasing number of information and communication
means, and educational levels raise and generalize, one can only predict an acceleration of the secu-
larization process at the global level and a concomitant increase in scientifically inspired solutions to
worldly challenges. Several well-established forces, such as narrow in-group concerns, individual
economic interests, and ancient but still powerful religious institutions will actively oppose those
innovative societal processes, as we can see when fundamentalist counter-movements upsurge as
a reactionary response to the individual, social, and moral progress humanity is experiencing. But
those are only backward inspired, usually built on myths about “The World We Have Lost” (Laslett,
2004). These are still powerful barriers to forceful progress in many domains of human life.
Response to Koen B. Tanghe: needed: an ethics and ideology for spaceship earth
Koen B. Tanghe strongly appreciates our ambitious and erudite endeavor to address humanity’s
challenges from a long-term evolutionary perspective and concentrates his comments on three cru-
cial and highly relevant issues: (1) the integration of individually and socially focused evolutionarily
based ethics; (2) the distinction between a minimalist and a maximalist evolutionarily based
approach; and (3) the question of how to convince the global community to adopt an evolutionarily
based ethical framework.
Regarding his first point, Tanghe labels our evolutionary approach to individual and community
developmental needs as a “liberal-evolutionary humanism.”We purposely avoided this terminology,
because we aimed at deriving a global ethic and general ethical guidelines from a holistic scientific
and evolutionary perspective. We wanted to avoid inferring our approach from preconceived ideo-
logical ideas. We tried to demonstrate that an evolutionary ethical approach in which the different
levels of biological organization—individual/population/generation—are considered as a whole and
in their mutual interdependencies can result in the establishment of ethical principles or guidelines
supporting individual emancipation as well as community development. In short, it is not humanist,
liberal, or socialist ideals that result in the advocacy of an evolutionarily based global ethic, but rather
the evolutionary ethic that leads to support for some humanist, liberal, and socialist ideals.
In his comments on our basic approach, Tanghe first highlights some vagueness in the target
article where we make a distinction between our use of the terms “evolutionarily based goals” in sec-
tion 5 and “ethical guidelines” in section 6. In our book we made the distinction between the general
pursuits or goals we developed in chapter 5 and the application in chapters 6-8 of our approach to
challenges related to three major groups of biosocial variation: individual variation, group relations,
and intergenerational replacement. Each topical section of chapters 6–8 ended with ethical reflec-
tions that included suggestions for topic-focused ethical guidelines.
Tanghe perceives that our evolutionary ethical approach with its general goals and specific guide-
lines lays out an outspokenly humanist ethics and ideology. He considers it a well thought out syn-
thesis of Harari’s (2015) three humanist strands—liberal humanism, socialist humanism, and
evolutionary humanism. Our discussion in chapter 4 of the major secular ideologies acknowledges
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that all major democratic modern ideologies include partial ethical elements that are valuable com-
ponents for an evolutionarily inspired universal ethics, but emphasized that modern humanism most
closely approaches an evolutionarily inspired ethics for the future development and evolution of
humankind. However, we should remind readers that we consider the achievement of ecological sus-
tainability to be the first ethical prerequisite for the further development and evolution of the human
species. We didn’t discuss this requirement in detail because we consider it to be a scientifically—
albeit not politically—generally accepted understanding. Hence, our evolutionary ethical perspective
is not strictly anthropocentric, as it might appear at first sight.
In his comments on the rationale for an evolutionary approach, Tanghe deals first with the
minimalist and maximalist approach. We described in our brief historical overview of the develop-
ment of evolutionary ethics in chapter 2 (pp. 45–58) the two major approaches in evolutionary
ethics, namely, the descriptive—or what Tanghe calls the “minimalist”—approach and the prescrip-
tive or maximalist approach. We didn’t dwell much on the minimalist approach because we
acknowledge this to be a generally accepted view among scholars who are well acquainted with evol-
ution sciences. We concentrated on the maximalist approach and are strongly supported in our argu-
mentation by Tanghe.
In his support of our vision about the trans- and possibly post-human future of our species
Tanghe distinguishes three major exits from nature: the agricultural exit from our natural ecological
niche, the scientific exit from our religious and mystical interpretation of our world, and the scientific
and biotechnological exit which will liberate us, through biotechnological enhancement, from the
limitations and flaws of our natural body. In our book we distinguished three major stages in the
development of human morality: a biosocial stage in the hunter-gatherer era, a religious stage in
the agrarian era, and a scientific stage in modernity. Tanghe’s splitting up of the last stage into
two separate phases is an interesting idea, because, indeed, a stage in which humanity is going to
decide and direct its own future evolution might be a qualitative leap in our evolutionary trajectory.
Next, Tanghe comments on the question of the naturalistic fallacy, mainly by giving several per-
tinent examples of unjustified Is/Ought transitions. Overall, his approach runs along the same lines
as ours.
Regarding the implementation of phenotypic and, in particular, genetic enhancement goals,
Tanghe rightly stresses that, while the ultimate decision should be left to individuals, in matters
of community control risks of non-involvement might be greater than involvement, because unequal
access to reprogenetic enhancement techniques could produce a two-tiered society of “GenRich” and
“GenPoor” people. In our book, we formulated this concern by pleading for community-driven
instead of market-driven enhancement policies.
In his last major comment, Tanghe raises the question of how to convince people to accept and
adopt an evolutionarily inspired ethics—obviously the Achilles tendon of our approach. Tanghe con-
siders the current absence of a common evolutionary ethics and ideology “to be merely a symptom of
a deeper problem or anomaly: the non-existence of an integrated, evolutionary, and historical science
of man.” He believes that the construction of an evolutionary-historical science of man would be
highly instrumental for developing an evolutionary approach to ethical and ideological questions.
The conclusion is relevant and timely. It will undoubtedly be highly supported by all researchers
who have been struggling for multidisciplinary research in human or social sciences or who have
been involved in policy advising where a well-integrated multidisciplinary approach is sorely needed.
Response to K. Thienpont: comment on the target article “Evolution science and
ethics in the third millennium: challenges and choices for humankind”
K. Thienpont begins by expressing his appreciation for our book and stating that he considers one of
its major contributions to be the inclusion of biological evolutionary processes considered in long-
term perspective, sociocultural changes, and ecological constraints in the discussion of each topic
addressed.
RELIGION, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR 49
Thienpont also evaluates positively our endeavor to address our subject based upon a rigorous
analysis of the evolutionary forces at work in past, present, and future contexts rather than on the
basis of some ideological framework. The concept of ideology is often associated with a particular
set of ideas that highlight a specific aspect of human life, for instance liberal ideology that strongly
favors individual freedom, Marxist ideology that interprets human history in terms of class struggle,
feminist ideology that is concentrated on gender relations, etc. The evolutionary approach to moral
issues is strongly holistic, taking into account genetic and environmental factors, individual and
group elements, emotion and reason, biological and cultural factors, and, above all, long term inter-
generational processes. The evolutionary ethics approach may be considered an ideology because it is
strongly action oriented, but it is action driven based on scientifically researched facts considered in
their mutual interdependencies and in their entirety.
Overall, Thienpont concurs with our evolutionary approach and in particular with our choice of
the central ethical goal, namely, the perpetuation of the hominization process, with the continuation
of the modernization process and the achievement of a sustainable ecology being crucial preliminary
conditions.
Thienpont mentions that the book is not easy to read because of the wealth of material discussed in
it. We received identical comments from several readers. The book is mainly addressed to scholars and
students in social and behavioral sciences, but we are aware that to reach interested lay people, we need
to convey in a reader-friendly way all of the subtleties of the various biological and cultural disciplines
that are involved in the study of human evolution and its implications for ethical questions. The
human evolution process with its dual bio-cultural inheritance system is a very complex phenomenon
that is not easy to understand, which is what has led to many incorrect narratives being devised.
Like several of the previous discussants, Thienpont supports our thesis that religion is maladap-
tive in the context of modernity, despite being adaptive in premodern societies. It would have been
interesting to also receive comments on the challenges of the major secular ideologies, discussed in
chapter 4. Although chapter 3 on religious ideologies is understandably twice the size of chapter 4 on
secular ideologies, we aimed at dealing with our ideological past and present in a coherent way.
Whereas religious readers will not be happy about our religious maladaptiveness thesis, we also sus-
pect that many non-believers will raise their eyebrows in response to our critical evaluation of many
present-day secular ideologies.
Thienpont comments rightly on the bio-cultural mismatch in modernity caused by the rapidly
increasing gap between our innate drives that emerged and are adapted to the Environment of Evol-
utionary Adaptedness (EEA) and the needs and opportunities in modernization. His comments on
this point concern two themes: the question of interventions on reproductive behavior and the ques-
tion of how to deal with the environmental and climate crisis.
Regarding the first question, Thienpont agrees that with the modernization process there is an
increasing need for biotechnological genetic enhancement, notwithstanding the “dark shadow of
the horrible practices” that were initiated in the name of eugenics. In our book we argued that
there is no scientific justification for the covert or even overt racist and/or classist purports of
many earlier eugenic measures. In a long footnote on page 372 we refuted the widespread view
that the eugenic policy of Nazism had anything to do with a scientifically based eugenics; on the con-
trary, that policy had only dysgenic effects.
Thienpont recognizes the mismatch between our innate drives and our cultural development
when it comes to addressing the environmental and climatic challenges we are facing, and he ques-
tions how to deal with this mismatch. In our book we mainly focused on adapting our behavior,
especially with respect to population growth, but we also recommended changing our production
and consumption patterns in order to alleviate the pressures on the environment. By doing so we
would hopefully avoid further environmental harm and possibly even give our planetary ecological
systems the opportunity to revitalize. It is also important to note that, while we acknowledge the
challenges related to anthropogenic climate change, we consider many other aspects of
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environmental decay—such as deforestation and overgrazing, decimation of biodiversity, and air/
water/soil pollution—to be equally challenging.
Next, Thienpont raises the key question how to overcome the mismatch between our ancient
innate drives and the modern world in which they function, a mismatch with many negative
effects at the level of individuals, societies, humanity in its entirety, and the planetary biosphere
as a whole. Throughout our book, we primarily pay attention to individual-focused educational
efforts (formal, non-formal, and informal) to change human behavior. However, the dimensions
and difficulties of the challenges that lie ahead convince us that community and even species-level
policies will be needed, not only to achieve long-term goals, but also to manage the current and
short-term future crises resulting from maladaptive policies that overburden the planetary environ-
ment and ecosystems.
In his last comment, Thienpont, a sociologist and bio-anthropologist, raised the thorny question
of the conciliation of the genetic variability needed for the future enhancement of the human species,
and the existing inequities resulting from natural, socio-economic, and socio-cultural living con-
ditions. Theoretically, the last point is largely resolvable by creating equal opportunities for every-
body and eliminating socio-economic and socio-cultural causes of inequities. But even in ideal
conditions, inequalities of biological origin due to unfavorable genes or genotype combinations
and unfortunate life course events will still prevail. Further progress in phenotypic and genetic
enhancement will certainly reduce, but perhaps not completely erase, such phenomena, at least
not in the short-term future. Hence, social protection measures, complementing phenotypic and
genetic enhancement efforts, will remain a necessity. In our book we argued that an evolutionarily
based ethic aimed at phenotypic and genetic enhancement is an endeavor that can only succeed
when applied at the population and even species levels.
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